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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
The Czech narrative consists of a centuries-long struggle for sovereignty that 
created sentiments and perceptions so deep-rooted they continue to influence Czech 
political policy. The correlation is purported by associate professor at the College of 
Wooster, Jeffrey S. Lantis: “Both history and experience are important considerations in 
the birth and evolution of states, and the strategic cultural identities that comprise them.1 
Therefore, examining Czech’s historical and cultural experience is pertinent to 
establishing a foundational understanding of current Czech identity and subsequent 
domestic political policy. 
While Czech culture dates back to 6th Century BC, Czech nationalism and the 
desire for sovereignty are considered to have fomented during the 15th Century. 
Throughout its struggle towards sovereignty, Czech efforts were repeatedly crushed by 
“outside” powers who often attempted to suppress Czech culture. Albeit the Czechs 
achieved independence a few times throughout history, each glimpse was short-lived due 
to invasions by one oppressor after the other. The Czechs faced subjugation under the 
Roman Catholic Church, the Hapsburgs, the Germans, and finally the Soviets—all 
stronger, outside powers who were intent on eliminating Czech nationalism. However, 
none were able to fully curb the nationalist sentiment and determination of the Czech 
people. As they seemingly witnessed defeat after defeat, Czech nationalism grew stronger 
                                                 
1 Jeannie L. Johnson, Kerry M. Kartchner, and Jeffrey Arthur Larsen, Strategic Culture and 
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security 
Policymaking, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 40. The authors’ definition of “strategic culture” is 
that set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and 
accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other 
groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives,” 9.   
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until finally realizing a lasting, independent Czech nation in the late 20th century. The 
Czech’s relentless fight for independence (that spanned centuries) demonstrates the 
tenacity of Czech nationalism which still pervades both the Czech ethos and political 
policy today. This marked nationalism, oppressive past, and reverence for its former 
leaders, contributed to the development of Czech’s strategic culture and xenophobia. An 
analysis of Czech history—its experience with oppressors, foreigners, and with the 
West—offers insight into how Czech nationalism and xenophobia influence Czech’s past, 
current, and potential future policy on immigration. 
To further understand the impact of Czech history on its current immigration 
policy, a comparison between Czech’s (like that of its neighbors within the Visegrád 
Four) historical experience with immigration with Western Europe’s, demonstrates both 
contrasting historical experiences and contemporary immigration policies. Following the 
Second World War and the division of Europe into Western and Eastern blocs, the Czech 
Republic and other states within the Eastern bloc experienced limited non-white 
immigration compared with the West. Possibly due to a combination of a lack of 
exposure to mass non-white immigrants and historic xenophobia, Czech attitudes toward 
its own immigrant populations and potential immigrant populations remain poor.  
Czech’s current largest, non-white immigrant populations—the Roma and 
Vietnamese—remain small and have arguably failed to assimilate into Czech society. 
While Czech Roma immigrated to the Czech lands centuries ago, and the Vietnamese 
arrived within the past few decades, the two ethnic groups continue to be perceived as 
“outsiders.” A study of the two groups’ assimilation progress suggests that the Czech’s 
discriminatory behavior is an offshoot of the Czech struggle for nationalism and 
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consequent xenophobia. The study also helps to predict the prospect that another non-
white immigrant population—specifically Muslim immigrants—may successfully 
assimilate into Czech society.  
Since 2015, the topic of Muslim immigration became increasingly pertinent as 
Europe faced the largest wave of immigration since post-WWII. The controversial issue 
has sparked numerous debates among EU member states—one of which was the 
distribution of millions of refugees. The EU Council determined that the overwhelming 
numbers of refugees arriving primarily in Italy and Greece would be redistributed among 
EU states per the European Agenda on Migration. The quota plan tested Czech’s 
xenophobic perception that permeates its strategic approach to Muslim refugees. Possibly 
due to the rise of Islamist terrorism throughout Western Europe and the onset of the 
migrant crisis in 2015, xenophobic sentiments have morphed into Islamophobia, causing 
Czech and its regional allies in the V4 to resist and denounce the EU’s redistribution 
plan. Czech officials unsurprisingly denounced the plan, cited their “Islamophobic” 
sentiments, and accused the plan of impeding Czech sovereignty. Although only Slovakia 
and Hungary challenged the plan in the EU court, the V4 collectively expressed their 
distaste for Muslim immigrants. Their leaders referenced the increased frequency of 
Islamist terror attacks throughout Western Europe and were unconvinced that Muslims 
can successfully assimilate. This expressed hostility towards Muslim immigrants is 
propagated by the Czech Republic—further supporting the notion that the same 
discrimination that plagues its current non-white groups is likely to similarly affect any 
relocated Muslim immigrants into the Czech Republic—or perhaps worse. Ultimately 
suggesting that holding the Czech Republic and the remaining V4 countries accountable 
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to the quota plan would offer Muslim refugees little opportunity for successful 
assimilation. As the September 2017 deadline for relocations passed, the V4 countries 
collectively accepted only 28 of the mandated 11,069 despite EU threats of fines against 
the dissenting countries. In addition, there is a growing aversion to the quota plan by 
other member states (e.g., Austria, Estonia, Latvia, Romania). While the EU still lacks an 
agreeable solution to the future of immigration, the quota plan remains a contentious 
topic within the continued discussion.  
Even in the historically diverse populations of Western Europe, the Czech 
sentiment is becoming increasingly popular. Whether due to terror attacks or economic 
anxieties, the deeply-divisive topic of immigration is witnessing various political 
consequences as governments throughout Europe (especially Central and Eastern Europe) 
are becoming increasingly populist.2 The adamant devotion to anti-immigration policies 
has fueled a call for less EU integration and underlines growing Eurosceptic sentiments. 
Politicians have successfully gained popularity by campaigning on nativist, xenophobic, 
and “Eurosceptic” platforms.  
In the Czech Republic, the populist party ANO—led by Andrei Babiš—won three 
times the number of votes of its nearest rival in Czech’s October elections, further 
echoing the recent shift in Europe in favor of anti-establishment groups.3 Babiš 
successfully campaigned primarily on an agenda of anti-Muslim immigration and on 
                                                 
2 Matthew Goodwin, "European Populism Is Here to Stay," The New York Times, 20 October 
2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/opinion/european-populism-is-here-to-stay.html.“In 2000, 10 
of the 15 national governments within the European Union had left-wing parties in power. Today, only six 
of the 28 national governments do.” 
 
3 Robert Muller, "Czech Election Winner Babis Meets Anti-EU Party in Hunt for Viable 
Government," Business Insider, 26 October 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/r-czech-election-
winner-babis-meets-anti-eu-party-in-hunt-for-viable-government-2017-10. 
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limiting Czech’s integration into the EU, demonstrating the degree to which both 
nationalism and xenophobia motivate the Czech people. This platform is likely to also be 
utilized by current Czech President Miloš Zeman during his campaign for the upcoming 
January 2018 presidential election. If Zeman is reelected, the Czech Republic will 
witness the furthest shift right in politics in decades, further aligning it with the V4, and 
in-tandem with the rise of populism through Central and Eastern Europe—and possibly in 
Western Europe. While neither Czech politician advocates a “Czexit” from the EU or 
NATO, a coalition of the two has the potential to impact its neighbors within the region 
and even Western Europe. With officials in the V4—and now both Austria and 
Germany—advocating anti-immigration and anti-Muslim stances, the new Czech 
administration is likely to continue to ally with the V4 and exploit the growing 
Islamophobia pervading Western Europe to influence EU policy.  
This thesis will examine the roots of Czech’s cultural identity, the events that 
shape it, and its current impact on Czech policy. The thesis begins with an understanding 
of the Czech historical experience which demonstrates an entrenched sense of 
nationalism and xenophobia. The effects of which are detailed in a study of the 
assimilation progress of its two largest non-white minority populations (the Czech Roma 
and Vietnamese) that not only suggests a low probability for Czech’s future immigrant 
populations to integrate, but emphasizes the depths of Czech xenophobia. The thesis then 
considers the controversy following the European Agenda on Migration where EU 
populists began capitalizing on Islamophobic and Eurosceptic sentiments to garner 
popularity among their populations. In October, the Czech Republic reflected this trend 
by electing Andrei Babiš’ party to majority in Czech’s Parliament. As current President 
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Miloš Zeman is popularly considered for reelection, the thesis ultimately predicts that a 
government led by both Babiš and Zeman will accelerate the populist momentum that is 
currently sweeping Central and Eastern European states. 
The chapters are organized chronologically, beginning with an historical 
background of the experiences shaping Czech’s identity and perceptions, to the current 
influence of its cultural narrative within the context of the EU and the migrant crisis. 
Chapter Two examines the history of the formation of the Czech Republic to demonstrate 
the depths of Czech nationalism and xenophobia. Chapter Three analyzes the poor 
integration status of both the Czech Roma and Vietnamese to illustrate the negative 
effects of its xenophobia on its current immigrant populations and speculate that future 
non-white immigrants will suffer the same meager results. The previous two chapters 
serve as a prerequisite for Chapter Four and its discussion on the Czech Republic’s 
perspectives on EU immigration following the European Migrant Crisis of 2015. The 
chapter considers the Czech stance within the scope of the Visegrád Four as well as in 
comparison with the liberal policies typical of Western Europe. It illustrates the historic 
dichotomy between the two perspectives, but addresses the rising popularity of 
Islamophobia and Euroscepticism across all of Europe. The fourth chapter concludes with 
an updated discussion of Czech Republic’s recent Parliamentary elections—which 
effected a shift right in the government—that echoes the populist trend pervading Eastern 
and Central Europe. The confluence of all the previous chapters is recapitulated in the 
final chapter (Chapter Five) to support the thesis’ assertion that the Czech Republic’s 
deep-rooted historic and cultural narratives negatively affect Czech’s non-white 
immigrant populations, will produce the same effects on future Muslim immigrants, and 
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will ultimately reflect the rising trend of populism throughout Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
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CHAPTER TWO: CZECH NATIONALISM 
 
The history of the Czech Republic is filled with oppression, deception, and an 
overall struggle towards independence. Beginning in at least the 15th Century, the Czech 
people faced one of their first experiences with an outside power intent on suppressing 
Czech identity. While this was only the first of many struggles the Czech people would 
endure in the face of more powerful “outsiders,” it also marked the beginnings of Czech 
nationalism. Over the course of at least half of a millennium, Czech nationalism fueled 
the ambition for a sovereign Czech state. By the 20th Century, the Czech people were able 
to achieve independence on a few separate occasions—only to be overtaken soon after. 
Amid defeat after defeat, their determination for independence did not falter, but 
doggedly propelled them towards to finally realize their goal in 1989. The experiences of 
both oppression and brief successes largely shape Czech cultural identity and subsequent 
security strategies. While Czech history demonstrates the depths of Czech nationalism, it 
also explains the development of the Czech’s fear of foreign powers—or xenophobia. 
Within the aims of this thesis, examining the associated development of these two 
perceptions throughout Czech history creates a fundamental understanding of the deep-
rooted narratives shaping its cultural identity which continue to pervade contemporary 
Czech policy. 
 
Czech Late Middle Ages 
During the 15th century, conflict in the Czech lands (the territories of Bohemia, 
Moravia, and Czech Silesia) took the form of a religious reform movement between 
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Catholics and Protestants. The rector of Charles University, a Czech realist, and ordained 
priest, Jan Hus, became both the new leader of the Bethlehem Chapel in Prague and of 
the reform movement. Hus’ Protestant, reformist agenda condemned the wealth, 
corruption, and hierarchical tendencies of the Roman Catholic Church which attracted the 
following of many Czech scholars at the university and the Czech-speaking masses to 
whom he preached. Conversely, it angered the conservative Czech and Catholic German 
populations who remained loyal to the Pope. 6 July 1415, Hus was tried, convicted, and 
burned at the stake for his heresies against the Church, ultimately strengthening a 
movement for reform that took the shape of a massive protest. In 1419, a group of Hus’ 
followers (Hussites) killed seven members of the city council by throwing them out of the 
window at Prague’s New Town Hall (known as the First Defenestration), ultimately 
prompting the Hussite Wars (1420-1434).  
Following the Hussites’ withstanding five separate crusades launched against 
them by the Church, both sides compromised in the agreement known as the Compacts of 
Basel. The Compacts outlined non-interference of religious practice and equality for both 
the Hussites and Catholics (although not officially accepted by Czech Catholics until 
1485). The significance of the Hussites’ feat included not only religious freedom, but 
sparked the determination of the Czech people to establish their national identity and 
independence. Although it is uncertain if at the time of the Hussite Wars, Czech 
nationalism was an outright ambition or the stirrings of a latent desire, the centuries that 
followed decidedly witnessed Czech nationalism foment and ultimately triumph. 
 
Czech Dark Ages 
Less than a century later in 1526, the Czech lands fell under Habsburg rule, and 
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remained there for nearly four centuries. The Peace of Augsburg (1555) temporarily 
settled the conflicts within the Holy Roman Empire stemming from the Protestant 
Reformation, with the principle cuius regio, eius religio (whose realm, his religion), that 
permitted each ruler to determine the religion of those ruled. Subsequent Habsburg kings 
did not impose Catholicism on their majority-Protestant subjects—who were granted 
additional concessions and rights under Rudolf II (Holy Roman Emperor and King of 
Bohemia (1576-1612). In 1609, three years before his death, Rudolf signed the Letter of 
Majesty, allowing Bohemia's largely Protestant estates the right to freely exercise their 
religion and set up a Protestant Bohemian state church controlled by the estates. 
The improvements seen under previous Habsburg kings were soon overshadowed 
in 1617, when Ferdinand II was crowned King of Bohemia (Holy Roman Emperor 1619). 
Infamous for his Catholic fervor and support for the Catholic Counter-Reformation, 
Ferdinand demonstrated his religious intolerance of his Protestant subjects when he 
forcibly ended the construction of Protestant chapels on royal land in 1618. Later that 
year, an assembly of Protestants preempted the Bohemian Revolt by throwing two 
Catholic Lords Regent (Count Jaroslav Borzita of Martinice and Count Vilem Slavata of 
Chlum) out of the palace window (both survived the 70-foot/21-metre fall) in what is 
referred to as the (Second) Defenestration of Prague.  
The defenestration ignited a larger Protestant rebellion against the Habsburgs in 
Bohemia in what grew to become the deadliest religious war in the history of Europe: 
The Thirty Years War (1618-1648).4 While the Protestant rebels deposed Ferdinand as 
                                                 
4 Matthew White, Selected Death Tolls for Wars, Massacres and Atrocities Before the 20th 
Century, January 2012, http://necrometrics.com/pre1700a.htm#30YrW. 
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emperor in 1619, any progress made proved exceedingly short-lived. Although the war 
lasted decades, Ferdinand II’s absence from the Bohemian throne lasted one year—he 
famously retook the throne following the one-hour Battle of Bílá Hora (White Mountain 
1620). After his reinstatement as King of Bohemia, progress toward Bohemian autonomy 
ended, and a century of doba temna (Dark Ages) began.5 
Ferdinand swiftly imposed various programs and punishments for those who 
opposed him. In 1621, 27 of the rebellion’s leaders (three lords, seven knights, and 17 
burghers) were executed at the Old Town Square in Prague, the land belonging to anyone 
who participated in the rebellion was confiscated, and the upper estates and royal 
boroughs that functioned as centers of economic and cultural activities were ruined. 
Further, he declared the Bohemian crown as the hereditary property of the Habsburg 
family—decimating the last vestiges of Bohemian independence and influence in 
elections. Ferdinand selected German-speaking Habsburgs and foreigners to fill vacant 
seats in the upper social classes, eventually instilling German as the official language of 
public affairs. The increase of German population and decline of Czech population—
primarily Czech nobility—both widened the disparity between upper and lower classes 
and marked the decline in the Czech language.  
Ferdinand notoriously rescinded Rudolf’s Letter of Majesty and officially 
declared Roman Catholicism as the sole Christian faith (the only non-Catholics permitted 
were Jews—although they faced discrimination), beginning the process of “re-
Catholicization” of the Bohemian and Moravian people. The uncompromising decree 
                                                 
5 William P. Guthrie, Battles of the Thirty Years War: From White Mountain to Nordlingen, 1618-
1635, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002, 92. 
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demanded the population choose one of two options: convert or emigrate. The Czech 
population thus suffered the forced emigration of Protestant Czechs in addition to 
casualties from the Thirty-Years War, epidemics of disease, and famine; collectively 
these effected an extensive decline in the population Czech lands. Estimates suggest the 
Bohemian population was reduced by up to one-half, and the Moravian by up to one-
fourth.6 
Among the Protestant Czechs forced to leave were the nobility and the 
bourgeoisie who comprised most of the intelligentsia. Those that remained and converted 
to Roman Catholicism received education and guidance from Jesuit missionaries who 
returned after being banned in 1618 by Bohemian directors. In 1654, the Jesuits merged 
their college in Prague, Klementinum, with Charles University—further subjecting higher 
education and literary production to Catholic control. Ferdinand II’s measures changed 
nearly every facet of Czech society: the population, language, role of the government, 
and even the appearance of Prague. Baroque style was hailed by the Church as the most 
faithful expression of their religious convictions and worldly ambitions and thus 
dominated Bohemian architecture, sculpture, and painting—ostensibly altering Czech 
identity.7 
 
Czech Enlightenment and National Revival 
The Habsburgs enforced re-Catholicization and “Germanization” of the Czech 
                                                 
6 “Czechs," Junior Worldmark Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Accessed 1 September 2017, 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/international/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/czechs. 
 
7 Hauner et al., “Czechoslovak History,” Encyclopædia Britannica, 7 March 2016, 
www.britannica.com/topic/Czechoslovak-history#toc42101. 
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people, suppressing the Czech language and national consciousness for nearly two 
centuries. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, Czech identity finally emerged during 
the Age of Enlightenment. Described by Czech historian Jaroslav Pánek: “At the 
beginning of the 19th century, only a very few nation-conscious Czechs and Germans in 
the Czech Lands were found, however, at the end of the century, most of the population 
defined themselves along national or ethnic lines.”8 The buddings of Czech nationalism 
are considered to have begun under Habsburg Empress Maria Theresa and her son Joseph 
II who succeeded her. The reforms they enacted characterized the Age of Enlightenment 
that dominated Europe in the 18th century. Therefore, although Maria and Joseph II 
centralized and Germanized their imperial bureaucracies, other educational and religious 
reforms ultimately increased economic and social mobility for the Czechs. Maria 
expelled the Jesuits in 1773, required educational instruction for all children ages six-
twelve, and shifted educational emphasis from theology to the sciences. As the nobility 
began focusing on industrialization and Czech peasants moved to cities to work in the 
manufacturing centers, the urban areas (previously dominated by the German population) 
became increasingly Czech. Also, as the children of Czech peasants received education 
and attended university, a new Czech intellectual elite emerged. During this same period, 
the population of Bohemia nearly quadrupled, and a similar increase occurred in 
Moravia.9 
After co-ruling with his mother for ten years, Joseph’s sole reign (1780-1790) 
                                                 
8 Jaroslav Pánek and Oldřich Tůma, A History of the Czech Lands, Prague: Karolinum, 2014, 296. 
 
9 Ihor Gawdiak, Czechoslovakia: A Country Study, Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 
1987. 
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expanded upon his mother’s reforms by issuing new edicts and laws along the same 
Enlightenment principles. This included his issue of the Patent of Tolerance (1781) and 
the Edict of Tolerance (1782), each respectively granting tolerance to non-Catholic 
Christians and Jews. The collective policies of Joseph II (known as Josephinism) helped 
create a unified, centralized multi-national government and a rational, secular society that 
permitted greater freedom and equality. This included freedom for serfs, lighter 
censorship for the press and theatre, and an aggressive policy on religious toleration. 
While the elite remained highly Germanized, the Czech peasantry and their patois stirred, 
experiencing a national “awakening” and the beginnings of the Czech National Revival. 
Although often referred sardonically as an “enlightened despot,” Joseph’s Enlightenment 
reforms undeniably paved a course for Czech nationalism to progress in the following 
decades.10 
The early, philological phase of Czech revival witnessed increased literacy, 
knowledgeability, and the demand for printed texts. By 1785, the Czech intelligentsia and 
waves of scholars began recording and systematizing the Czech language, and created a 
literary milieu through the large-scale publishing of books and newspapers in Czech.11 In 
1791, Czech instruction and literature was reintroduced to Charles University.  
One of the most influential figures of the Revival was journalist, Václav Matěj 
Kramerius, whose works contributed the revival of written Czech. He worked for the 
only Czech language weekly before starting his own newspaper (Pražské poštovské 
                                                 
10 T.C.W. Blanning, Joseph II and Enlightened Despotism, London: Longman, 1994, 64. 
  
11 Pánek and Tůma. 
 
  
 15 
 
noviny, renamed Krameriusovy c.k. vlastenecké noviny) and a publishing house (Česká 
expedice). Most of the Czech books of his time were published at Česká expedice, with 
Kramerius authoring about 80 books himself.12 Two other contributors to the Czech 
revival are Josef Dobrovský, and Josef Jungmann who are credited for the introduction of 
Czech study to state schools and their proliferation of Czech literature. Derek Sayer, a 
popular Czech historian, credits Jungmann’s translation of Milton’s “Paradise Lost” as 
the cornerstone of modern literary Czech language. Dobrovský (a student of Jungmann) 
personally published five volumes of a Czech-German dictionary. The efforts of these 
two earned them the honorific dub: “the creators of the modern Czech language.”1314 
As Czech nationalism was ignited by the revival of language, the dissemination of 
cultural history via text was the fuel. Another scholar under Dobrovský’s guidance, the 
most influential figure during the Revival, was František Palacký—one of three 
acclaimed “Fathers of the Nation.”15 Palacký and Count Francis Sternberg (one of the 
few Bohemian nobles interested in history of the region) helped found the association 
known as the Society of the Bohemian Museum (1818). The Society aimed to revive a 
Czech nationalist sentiment by collecting objects and articles connected with the history 
of Bohemia. Palacký’s faithfulness to the cause was demonstrated when reacting to 
critics and doubters of the Revival, even unleashing a fiery diatribe on Dobrovský once 
                                                 
12 Derek Sayer, The Coasts of Bohemia: A Czech History, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
2000, 79. 
 
13 Ibid., 109. 
 
14 Vladimir Macura, Hana Píchová, and Craig Cravens, The Mystifications of a Nation: "The 
Potato Bug" and Other Essays on Czech Culture, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2010, 27. 
 
15 Sayer, 129. 
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for only writing in German: “If we all act thus, then indeed our nation must perish 
through intellectual famine. As for me, even if I was a gipsy by birth and the last 
descendant of that race, I should consider it as my duty to strive with all my might that 
honoured records of my race should be preserved to the history of humanity.”16  
 Palacký’s five-volume magnum opus, The History of the Czech Nation in 
Bohemia and Moravia chronicles the history of Bohemia to 1526 as a dialectical conflict 
between the Slavs and Germans, based on national and religious differences. Despite 
Palacký’s noble patronage, he was mindful of the opposition his work would attract from 
the Austrian political elite who were ruled by Francis I (previously known as Francis II) 
at the time. An opponent of the French Revolution, Francis was distrustful of any form of 
radicalism and set up an extensive network of police spies and censors to monitor 
dissent.17 Regardless of the risks Palacký faced in his work, his convictions overcame his 
fears. Evidence of this can be seen in his personal account of the nature of the 
government—and may have also incited the people of Bohemia:  
The government authorities, no doubt, well knew that the former attitude of the 
Austrian government with regard to Bohemia would find no mercy before the 
judgement- seat of history, even though the sufferers could no longer make their 
grievances known. What happened in the interior of Bohemia during the Thirty 
Years War is even now one of those secrets of history that make the few who 
have attempted even slightly to lift the veil, tremble. I was some time ago asked 
by men of some importance whether it would not be better if the unhappy and 
melancholy events of the past were consigned to complete oblivion, rather than 
that an attempt should be made to incite men's minds by recalling these events, 
thus disturbing the happy peace of the present time. These men knew nothing of 
the events of the past, but they felt instinctively that an account of the past would 
excite men's minds. No wonder therefore that the government did not further 
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historical studies, and indeed endeavoured to hinder them in every way.18 
 
Palacký’s favorable portrayal of the Hussites drew consternation from the censors who 
purposely delayed the progress of his work. They allowed him to release only specific 
volumes at designated times, issued alternative works to undermine his content, and 
removed or interpolated sections of his text.19  
Before the Revolutions of 1848 began, the Czech Revival was propelled almost 
exclusively by language, literature, and culture. The Revolutions spurred the Czechs (and 
other Slavs) to convene in their first political assembly, transforming the Revival into a 
politically-powered vessel. With Palacký at the head as President of the Prague Slavonic 
Congress, he steered the various Slavic nations in unity, towards the goal of civil and 
cultural rights for all Slavs within the monarchy. The Congress approved the Manifesto to 
the Nations of Europe that outlined equal rights for all nations. However, the Congress 
ended prematurely due to violent events at the 1848 Prague Uprising. The political unrest 
following the Uprising prevented the Manifesto from improving the political course for 
the Czech people. Despite this and other set-backs (e.g., the suppression of Slav identity 
under the new dual-monarchy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a failed attempt to attain 
equal status with Hungary in the Fundamental Articles of 1871), Czech identity was fully 
formed and determined towards independence. The Czech National Revival persevered—
into the First World War which proved to be pivotal in the creation of the First 
Czechoslovak Republic. 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 92-93.  
 
19 Monika Baár, Historians and Nationalism: East-Central Europe in the Nineteenth Century, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, 98-99. 
  
 18 
 
The First World War 
 The Czech people feared the potentially detrimental effects of a German victory 
on Czech autonomy which prompted them to adamantly oppose the Central Powers (the 
German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires, and the Kingdom of Bulgaria). 
Austro-Hungarian rule was increasingly despotic under both František Josef I and 
Charles I who suppressed the rise of Slav nationalism by heavily censoring the press, 
forbidding public meetings, and imprisoning anyone displaying any form of divergence 
from the dual monarchy. Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, a philosopher, politician, and former 
member of both the Reichsrat (Austrian Imperial Council) and the Young Czech Party 
was exiled for championing both a unified Czechoslovak nation and the dissolution of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. While exiled, Masaryk traveled around the world, 
successfully garnering the support and recognition of many leaders, including U.S. 
President Woodrow Wilson. Soon after the U.S. joined the war, Wilson debuted his 
salient Fourteen Points outlining principles of peace. Point Ten pertinently demanded: 
“The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see 
safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous 
development.”20 Following the Fourteen Points, were two key documents that 
contributed to the creation of the first Czechoslovak Republic in 1918: the Pittsburgh 
Agreement (the Czech-Slovak memorandum of understanding to create an independent 
Czechoslovakia) and the Treaty of Versailles (ended the First World War and outlined the 
new territorial arrangements).  Finally, after almost four centuries of Habsburg rule, the 
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Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed and the “Czechoslovak State had come to life.”21 
 
The First Czechoslovak Republic and the Second World War 
 The First Czechoslovak Republic (Czechoslovakia, ČSR) attained its 
independence (recognized on 28 October 1918) and elected Masaryk as its first President 
to its parliamentary democracy. Parliament ratified the Constitution of the Czechoslovak 
Republic in February 1920, adopting inspiration from the French, Swiss, and American 
constitutions in its dedication to democratic rights and freedoms. The nascent government 
demonstrated stability, a prospering economy, increased international relations (via 
agreements such as: The Little Entente, Treaty of Alliance and Friendship between 
France and Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak-Soviet Agreements), and held 
parliamentary elections.22 However, the new republic’s apparent progress was plagued by 
the unrest of the Sudeten Germans (ethnic Germans that lived in former Bohemia) and 
fascist Germans (who reoccupied the Rhineland in direct violation of the Versailles 
Treaty). Czechoslovaks felt increasingly isolated once Great Britain and France 
notoriously opted for a policy of “appeasement” toward Germany and again when 
Germany and Poland signed the Germany-Polish Non-Aggression Pact. 
By 1937, the Czechoslovak Republic was one of the last remaining democracies 
in Central and Eastern Europe.23 The following year, the Sudeten German Party became 
the dominant political group among the fascist, German population of the ČSR. After 
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witnessing the successful annexation of Austria to Germany (Austrian Anschluss), the 
Sudeten German party advocated their own “Anschluss,” causing further trepidation 
among Czechoslovakians. In a show of resolve, the Czechoslovak army mobilized at the 
border where the German population was concentrated to demonstrate their resistance to 
the growing fascist empire. This mobilization and the Soviet Union’s commitment to the 
security alliance offered Czechoslovaks some relief. However, as British Prime Minister 
Neville Chamberlain began direct negotiations with the German Chancellor Adolf Hitler, 
any remaining confidence in the Czechs quickly dissipated.  
Hitler decried the Czechoslovak oppression of Sudeten Germans who populated 
the border areas of the Czech lands and demanded their secession. Great Britain 
responded with faithfulness to their policy of appeasement, offering Czechoslovakia an 
ultimatum: agree to the terms, or face abandonment. Czechoslovakia conceded to the 
demands of its Western allies. Days later, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy 
(Czechoslovakia was not allowed to participate; thus, the slogan was coined: o nás bez 
nás or “about us, without us”) met and signed the Munich Agreement (known to Czechs 
as the Munich Betrayal or Mnichovská zrada). The agreement authorized Germany to 
occupy the Sudetenland immediately and effectively ended the First Czechoslovak 
Republic—less than twenty years after its founding—in 1938. The agreement was a 
violation of international law, a violation of the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia, and was 
the ultimate betrayal by its western allies. 
 
The Second and Third Czechoslovak Republics  
Second Republic. The newly outlined Second Czechoslovak Republic attempted 
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to maintain its remaining sovereignty amid an encroaching fascist Germany. Hitler’s 
demands for the Munich Agreement were based on claims of Czechoslovak persecution 
of ethnic Germans residing in the border regions. He quickly began “cleansing” those 
regions which entailed “preventative” arrests of opponents to the new regime. Within the 
first months, about ten thousand people were arrested, one-third of which were sent to 
concentration camps.24 Many others emigrated due to fears of repression and persecution. 
By the end of 1938, less than half of the original Czech population remained in the 
occupied territory.25 Czech political parties and organizations quickly dissolved, and 
government offices switched (once again) to speaking solely in German. Speaking Czech 
in public was subject to fines and public officials were subject to arrest for speaking 
Czech in private. In the Opava Region, most of the Czech schools were closed (those that 
remained open began instructing Nazi curriculum), Czechs could not attend secondary 
schools, and no Czech press, theatre, radio, or film was played. In the Hlučín region (like 
Opava), Czech cultural life was also forbidden, however, every Czech school was closed. 
Czech books were taken from the libraries and sometimes publicly burned—estimates 
suppose as many as twenty thousand books were destroyed.26 The familiar process of 
Germanization had vigorously restarted, endangering Czech identity once again. 
The previous liberal, democratic order had seemingly failed them. The 
Czechoslovak territory, economy, social structure, and morale were devastated. If 
conditions were not sufficiently abysmal, the Munich Agreement—that permitted 
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German forces to occupy the northern and western border regions of the region—was no 
longer satisfactory to Hitler’s ambitions. Less than six months later (169 days), he 
annexed the remaining territory of Czechoslovakia, ending the Second Czechoslovak 
Republic, and creating the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. 
Forced into a seemingly hapless situation, despair did not destroy the ideological 
foundation of the Czech people. German oppression of Czech culture and identity struck 
a familiar nerve in the Czech people. Displays of national solidarity emerged alongside 
growing anti-German attitudes in the form of mass demonstrations. Nazi intolerance and 
dissent reached new heights following a demonstration at the funeral for student and anti-
German protestor: Jan Opletal. Following which, the Nazis launched a campaign to 
thoroughly remove all traces of Czech intelligentsia. This included sending over a 
thousand university students to concentration camps where nine were executed without 
trial.27 Former politicians, journalists, and state employees began organizing the 
resistance. Magazines supporting the resistance were illegally published, an underground 
military was created, and the Central Leadership of Home Resistance (Ústřední vedení 
odboje domácího, ÚVOD) functioned as the shadow government. While exiled in 
London, former Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš garnered support for ÚVOD from 
Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States.  
The Soviet Union was the exiled-government’s most committed and powerful ally 
against Nazi Germany. Following Operation Barbarossa in 1941 (the German invasion 
of the Soviet Union) the Soviet Union facilitated the formation of the Czechoslovak 
armed forces from the hundreds of refugees residing in its territory. Although Beneš 
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feared the possibility that partnering with the Soviets would end with the Soviets 
installing communism in a liberated Czechoslovakia, he could not risk alienating the 
powerful ally. He determined to foster cooperation between the democratic and 
communist governments by approving a communist-dominated cabinet—naively hoping 
the alliance would ultimately create a “bridge” between the East and the West. The two 
governments united against their common, fascist enemy via political and military 
agreements. Article Four of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Pact of Friendship, Mutual Aid, and 
Post-War Cooperation (1943) outlined both parties’ commitments—including a 
withdrawal of Soviet forces following the war:  “the High Contracting Parties, having 
regard to the security interests of each of them, agree to close and friendly cooperation in 
the period after the restoration of peace and agree to act in accordance with the principles 
of mutual respect for their independence and sovereignty, as well as of non-interference 
in the internal affairs of the other State.”28 
Third Republic. In 1945—after six years of oppressive Nazi occupation and an 
estimated 340,000 Czechoslovak deaths—WWII was over, and Czechoslovakia was an 
autonomous state once again.29 The Third Czechoslovak Republic feared the Sudeten 
Germans would demand autonomy once again and stir another uprising. ČSR feared a 
repeat of the 1938 elections where over 97% of the Sudeten Germans voted for the Nazi 
Party and welcomed the Nazi invasion shortly thereafter.30 Therefore, the newly 
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reinstated Czechoslovak government was eager to rid its territory of the remaining 
Germans to ensure its future security. The Beneš Decrees created in 1940 (while the 
government was in exile) were implemented soon after Czechoslovak liberation and were 
considered, the "final solution of the German question" (konečné řešení německé otázky). 
The Decrees revoked the citizenship of traitorous Hungarians and Germans, expelled 
them from the country, and expropriated their property without compensation. The issue 
of Czechoslovakia’s future security, the affirming Potsdam Agreement (pertained to 
German expulsion solely), or perhaps the desire for revenge, motivated Beneš to 
mercilessly deport around two million Germans or 90% of the ethnic German population. 
Of those removed, estimates of German deaths range from 14,000 to 30,000 and were 
attributed to massacres, forced labor, internment camps, suicides, disease, and 
starvation.31 Following Nazi Germany, Beneš deemed the harsh expulsion a necessary 
measure against future subjugation and ensured the preservation of Czechoslovak 
independence. 
While the ČSR focused on expelling the Germans from its pre-war territory in the 
west, it faced an increasingly dangerous Communist threat from the east. The ČSR 
successfully regained its independence following WWII, but it did not take its former 
territorial shape. It reacquired the Sudeten border region, but had lost Sub-Carpathian 
Ruthenia to Soviet annexation. The loss of the latter combined with other Soviet 
territorial gains, ultimately causing the two countries to become immediate neighbors.  
Although the Czechoslovaks owed much of their liberation to the Soviet Union, 
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the political influence of the communists raised concern among the recovering 
democratic government. The Czechoslovaks who remained disenfranchised with the 
West (following the Munich Agreement) looked favorably toward the Czechoslovak 
Communist Party (KSČ) which was influenced by the East. The May 1946 elections 
maintained a non-communist majority with Beneš’ (a member of the Czech National 
Social Party, ČSNS) reelection as President and Jan Masaryk (son of the revered Tomáš 
Masaryk) as foreign minister, but communists gained key ministry positions (e.g., KSČ 
leader, Klement Gottwald as the new prime minister and leader of the police and armed 
forces). Gottwald capitalized on both anti-German sentiment and Czech nationalism, and 
declared the intent of the KSČ to proceed in democratic tradition.  This seemingly 
innocuous approach masked Gottwald’s true intentions as he subversively garnered a 
communist base of support. Tensions ignited between parties after Gottwald repudiated 
the Marshall Plan (American initiative providing economic aid to Europe) and began 
using the police force to suppress noncommunist opposition.32 Tensions erupted later that 
year when Interior Minister Václav Nosek was accused of attempting to transform the 
police and security forces into an instrument for the KSČ when he illegally removed all 
non-communists from the force. Gottwald stalled any efforts to address Nosek’s actions, 
inciting various non-communist members of the government to resign in protest. KSČ 
influenced the media, suppressed opposition, and removed most of the non-communist 
political members. Once Gottwald established a credible communist force, he demanded 
Beneš appoint a communist-dominated government. Fearful of civil war or the Red Army 
intervening, Beneš capitulated, effectively sanctioning the communist coup d’état, 25 
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February 1948. 
 
The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 
After the “bloodless” coup d’état of 1948, the communists quickly consolidated 
power by hosting a rigged election, firing (thousands) and arresting (hundreds) of non-
communists, expropriating private property, and creating a new Soviet-style constitution. 
Instead of signing it, Beneš tendered his resignation and was succeeded by Gottwald. For 
the second time within a decade, the Czechoslovak Republic was consumed by an 
authoritarian dictatorship. 
As the countries in Eastern Europe fell prey to Soviet communism and completed 
the formation of the USSR, Europe was partitioned into Western and Eastern blocs. 
Neither the shock of the coup or fear of communism expanding was enough to motivate 
the recovering Western bloc to do much more than verbally denunciate Soviet actions. 
Lacking assistance, the former Czechoslovak Republic unwillingly remained under 
Communist rule as a Soviet Satellite State throughout most of the Cold War. However, as 
history showed, Czech nationalism survived centuries of oppression—first the 
Habsburgs, then fascist Germany—and the tenacity for autonomy would not be deterred 
by the Soviet regime. 
Prague Spring. The communist regime in Czechoslovakia centralized political, 
economic, and social life. By the 1960s, the planned economy was declining but social 
concerns continued to rise. The First Secretary of the KSČ, Alexander Dubček, enacted 
the Action Programme of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia with aims to liberalize 
the Communist government. Although he was staunchly communist, Dubček believed 
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that the Communist government could garner popular support by removing some of its 
strictest facets and permitting greater tolerance. While he successfully gained public 
approval, he did not anticipate the momentum the reform would gain, or that it would 
become the nucleus of a brief Czechoslovak liberation (the Prague Spring). Soviet leader, 
Leonid Brezhnev, intervened by renouncing the Action Programme, conducting military 
exercises in Czechoslovak territory, and implementing the Brezhnev Doctrine—requiring 
Warsaw Pact forces to intervene and protect communist rule. Reformists were suppressed 
once again by re-tightening censorship, culture, and independent thought.  
A key form of dissident activity was samizdat—the practice of reproducing 
censored publications by hand, and passing the copies from reader to reader.  Václav 
Havel, a Czech writer and dissident, and future Czech president, helped found Charter 
77. The informal civic initiative lambasted the government for its violation of civil and 
human rights. He and two others were detained with the original copy, but others were 
disseminated via samizdat. The government endeavored to minimize the impact of the 
charter and harshly punished the charter’s members to intimidate other dissidents. 
Although the copies did not reach widespread populations at the time, the leaders of the 
Charter reemerged in the years preceding the Velvet Revolution to strengthen the 
opposition and transition the nation to a lasting democratic state. 
Velvet Revolution. Reform-minded Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev, 
implemented decentralizing policies known as prestavba (the Czechoslovak equivalent of 
perestroika) that contributed to the end of the Cold War and communist rule in 
Czechoslovakia. By 1986, Gorbachev promised that the Soviet Union would no longer 
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interfere in Czechoslovakia.33 However, following the short-lived episode of 
liberalization under Dubček, the Czechoslovak population remained incredulous of 
Gorbachev’s intent and ability to enact lasting reform.  
Czechoslovaks took the initiative 17 November 1989, transforming a march 
commemorating the 50th anniversary of the murder of anti-German protestor, Jan Opletal, 
into a pro-democracy protest. The Czechoslovaks protested the Soviet puppet 
government with non-violent demonstrations that resulted in many students being beaten 
by police. Once the rumor that a student was killed began to circulate, the protest fostered 
even more popular support in the form of hundreds of thousands of participants and 
additional demonstrations in Prague.34 Estimates suggest that more than 200,000 
protestors organized on 19 November and grew the next day to 500,000.35 By 24 
November, all the senior leaders of the KSČ resigned and Parliament elected Dubček as 
Chairman of the Federal Assembly and Havel as state President. The success of the 
Czechoslovak protests exemplified both their dedication to civil liberties and that even 
the most oppressive regime could be defeated by non-violent protest—earning the 
moniker: Velvet Revolution. The revolution transformed the country’s political, 
economic, and social system, and marked the end of 41 years of communist rule in 
Czechoslovakia. 
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The Czech Republic 
 Czechoslovakia’s new parliamentary republic, market economy, and removed 
censorship laws signaled its transition from communism to democracy. In June 1990, 
Czechoslovakia held its first free election since 1946—witnessing an impressive 95% 
voter turnout.36 A few years later in 1993, Czechoslovakia peacefully divided into two 
independent states becoming the Czech Republic (also known as Czechia or CZ) and the 
Slovak Republic (Slovakia) in what is known as the Velvet Divorce. The rapidity and 
seamlessness of both Czech Republic’s transition to democracy and split from Slovakia 
demonstrated its commitment to both western values and relations with its neighboring 
countries. 
The CZ continues to maintain relations with neighbors (Slovakia, Poland, and 
Hungary) in the political and cultural alliance known as the Visegrád Four (V4). Also, 
Czech Republic’s capacity as a democratic nation was acknowledged when it acceded to 
NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004. Both international organizations require its members 
to share a standard of security, economics, and democratic rights and values—all which 
CZ maintains. Today, the Czech Republic maintains a parliamentary democracy and is 
consistently considered one of the highest ranked democracies in the world.37 
  
Summary 
 Leading up to the Hussite Wars, Czech Protestants faced religious oppression by 
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the Roman Catholic Church. Next, they endured centuries of cultural oppression under 
the Hapsburg Empire, finally achieving an independent state following the First World 
War. This short-lived victory is remembered as a betrayal by its western allies—o nás bez 
nás (about us, without us)—who essentially gifted the ČSSR’s territory to Nazi Germany. 
Following the Second World War, cultural oppression, and concentration camps, 
Czechoslovaks had yet another brief taste of independence in the Third Republic before 
another annexation—this time by the Soviets. Around 40 years later, and after achieving 
lasting independence, the role of Czech nationalism within the Czech narrative can be 
considered at least two ways. 
 First, the sense of nationalism experienced by the Czech people not only 
originated centuries ago, but was a compelling source of motivation for the Czechs to 
ambition for an independent state. That determination survived several setbacks via 
invasion, oppression, annexation per the Roman Catholic Church, the Hapsburg Dynasty, 
Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union. Despite one upset after another, Czech nationalism 
persevered and is attributed to a lasting, sovereign Czech state. The Czech’s ardent 
nationalism propelled it to emerge from its repeated subjugation—delivered by larger 
nations—as the impressive democracy it is today. 
 On the other hand, that repeated subjugation via various outside powers, the 
forfeit of territory (per the Munich Agreement) determined by its Western allies (without 
Czech input) prior to WWII, and the alliance with the Soviet Union that ended in Czech’s 
annexation following WWII, impressed the Czech memory with apprehension and 
distrust. It is unsurprising that these experiences created the xenophobic insecurity that 
“outsiders” are the enemy. Overall, Czech’s history illustrates the strength of Czech 
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nationalism as it persevered through repeated oppression and attempts at elimination, and 
emerged from a velvet revolution triumphant, independent, and democratic. Its 
experience with despotic foreign powers and thus, prolonged struggle for independence 
(considerably recent when compared to its western European neighbors), remain a 
familiar and embittered image upon the Czech conscious. The nationalist, xenophobic 
Czech narrative continues to influence Czech politicians and its general population to 
retain an aversion to foreigners (including immigrants) as they fear a repeat of their 
troubled past. This is manifested in its current government policies. As Lantis asserted 
the correlation between history and experience with the strategic cultural identities of 
nations, therefore, Czech’s cultural and historical experience, revered leaders, and the 
media, combine to shape its current identity, perceptions, and security objectives. While 
this chapter outlined deep-seated narratives that define the Czech identity, the next 
chapter of this thesis analyzes the assimilation progress of Czech’s two largest, non-white 
minority populations to further demonstrate both the depths and tangible effects of the 
Czech’s xenophobic and nationalist sentiments. 
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CHAPTER THREE: CZECH ROMA AND VIETNAMESE POPULATIONS 
 
 Czech xenophobia bleeds into latent racism that is prevalent in the discriminatory 
treatment of its immigration populations—specifically its non-white minority groups—
resulting in the poor integration progress of both the Czech Roma and Vietnamese. As of 
2017, 10.55 million people make up the Czech population: 64% Czech, 5% Moravian, 
1.4% Slovak, 0.4% Polish, 0.2% German, and 26% undeclared.38 The population is 
essentially homogeneous, except for the populations of Vietnamese and Roma—the two 
primary, non-white populations in Czech Republic. The census totaled the Vietnamese 
population at approximately 83,000 and the Roma at 13,150—although it is estimated 
that the Roma population is closer to 250,000-300,000.3940 The reason for the significant 
discrepancy in registered Roma is likely because the Roma are purposely not registering 
with Roma nationality for fear of stigmatization due to their historical experience of 
discrimination. Regardless, although the Roma and Vietnamese constitute a fraction of 
the total Czech population, it is within their efforts at assimilation, that the greatest 
indicators of Czech xenophobia exist.  
Utilizing a set of assimilation benchmarks helps to denote the advancement and 
integration of immigrants into society: Czech language fluency, education, citizenship, 
crime, housing, and employment. Often the benchmarks are interconnected and failure in 
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one often affects the rest (e.g., the Czech Interior Ministry requires both Czech fluency 
and permanent housing to qualify for citizenship). A comparison of the historical 
immigration of both the Czech Roma and Vietnamese and assessment of both group’s 
current assimilation progress—including the roles played by both Czech leaders and the 
media in propagating and normalizing discriminatory behavior—suggests that the Czech 
propensity for discrimination emanates from its historical narrative of xenophobia and 
perhaps its lack of interaction with non-white populations as experienced throughout 
Western Europe. Examining the effects of Czech’s xenophobic perceptions on the 
assimilation potential of its current non-white immigrants legitimizes the thesis’ assertion 
that Czech’s historical and cultural narratives created deep-seated perceptions, that those 
perceptions currently negatively affect its current non-white minority populations, and 
predicts that they will likely cause future, non-white immigrants (i.e., Muslims) to 
experience similar unsuccessful assimilation in the Czech Republic.  
 
Czech Roma 
In an interview in 1997, Vaclav Trojan, then-director of the non-profit Helsinki 
Citizen's Assembly, suggested: "Many people here [in the CZ] look at Roma as 
newcomers and migrants and not as an integral part of Czech society, of Czech culture, of 
the Czech nation."41 Now twenty years later, unfortunately Trojan’s statement remains 
true in many ways albeit with an exception—the Roma have resided in Czechia for 
centuries. In fact, the arrival of Roma (an ethnic group originally from Northern India 
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also known as “gypsies”) to the Czech lands is estimated as far back as the 15th century. 
At the time, the Bohemian and Moravian territory was under Habsburg rule. The 
centralized state wanted to settle the traditionally nomadic group and integrate them into 
the workforce to contribute economically—upending their lifestyle. During the reign of 
Holy Roman Empress Maria Theresa and her son Joseph II in the mid-18th century, 
measures to assimilate the group through Christianization and education showed progress 
in some areas of the empire, but was met mostly with resistance.42 The repressed Roma 
populations became increasingly concentrated in the more tolerant regions of Slovakia, 
Hungary, Romania, Serbia and Russia. 
During WWII, Nazi eugenics designated the Roma as “racially inferior” alongside 
the Jews. The Slovak-Roma endured “milder” persecution while approximately 95% of 
Czech Roma population was exterminated—largely at Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration 
camp.43 After the war and while under communist rule, many of the Slovak-Roma 
migrated (both voluntarily and involuntarily) to the evacuated Czech frontier regions and 
were dispersed as a cheap work force throughout the industrial areas of Bohemia and 
Moravia.44 This insertion of Roma into the CZ—rather than invitation—may have created 
the “foreigner” perception (mentioned by Vaclav Trojan in 1997) Czechs have of the 
Roma. Also, while under Soviet rule, Romani women were sterilized as part of an effort 
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to eradicate the population. Although changed—the women were no longer informed 
beforehand they were going to receive the procedure—the sterilization operations 
continued after the fall of the Soviet Union.45  
The litany of atrocities committed against the Roma reveal widespread 
discrimination by the Czech people and its institutions. Much of this intolerance exists 
today and contributes to the Roma’s inability to successfully assimilate into Czech 
society. The Roma have achieved less language fluency, received below-standard 
education, suffered greater unemployment and lived in poor living conditions compared 
to most Czechs. While these misfortunes are typically blamed on the Roma themselves, 
research suggests the lack of assimilation progress is the result of systemic discrimination 
and the Roma being socially ghettoized.46 The Roma have been targets of police 
brutality, denied entry to public venues (stores, restaurants, theatres), lived in segregated 
neighborhoods, and received unequal education opportunities. While several Czech 
leaders are making efforts to counteract the latent racism, the ubiquitous antipathy 
towards the Roma remains prevalent in Czech society. 
Language and Education. Attempts at assimilating the Roma populations 
encouraged the use of the national Czech language. During the communist era, this was 
implemented by forbidding the use of Romani language in schools. However, even after 
the regime collapsed, the Roma continued to face discrimination in the CZ. Roma parents 
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raised their children to speak Czech as their first language in hopes they would be better 
accepted into Czech society. The effects of this are seen in Czech Roma children today 
who decreasingly retain Romani language abilities.47 One of the problems that arose 
while speaking to their children was that the parents possessed poor Czech language 
skills as many of them spoke Czech or Slovak as their second language. They commonly 
spoke pidgin or a version of Czech with Romani grammatical elements and cases.48 This 
auxiliary version of Czech spoken by their children was conspicuously different to native 
Czech speakers. Once in school, ignorant teachers mistook the dialect as a speech 
impediment and sent the children to special schools for the mentally handicapped. 
Amnesty International studies indicate that although the Roma make up less than 2.8% of 
the total Czech population, they are disproportionately segregated from receiving 
mainstream education: 32% of children in education programs for pupils with mild 
mental disabilities are Roma and only 30% of Roma aged 20-24 have had a general or 
vocational secondary education (compared to 82% of non-Roma who have received 
secondary education.49  
 In 2009, Czech Republic launched the United Nations Educational Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Inclusion in Education Project to increase enrollment, 
improve education, and reduce discrimination for all students. Efforts to end 
inappropriately placing Roma children (without disability) in mentally-handicap schools 
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seem successful. However, instead they are being segregated into separate Roma classes 
or schools that are inferior or lower quality.50 In 2014, the European Commission 
initiated infringement proceedings against the CZ for its continued discrimination against 
Roma children in schools. The Czech government enacted the School Act in 2015 (and 
new amendments as recently as 2016) which promises to tackle the discrimination by 
desegregating schools, providing the necessary resources to support Roma students, and 
eliminate prejudice among the teachers and non-Roma students.51 If the School Act 
delivers its promises and Roma students receive fair educational opportunities, this will 
not only increase their ability to attend university and find better jobs, but will ultimately 
help them to assimilate in the CZ as contributing members of society.  
Citizenship. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Czech’s split with 
Slovakia, CZ enacted new citizenship laws restricting who would receive Czech 
citizenship. Those with Slovak state citizenship were required to apply for Czech 
citizenship and meet a series of stringent requirements. Although many Roma had lived 
in Czech territory since the conclusion of WWII, few had changed their state citizenship 
from Slovak to Czech. Not only were they considered Slovak citizens under the new law, 
but their children—even if born in the Czech Republic—were considered Slovak citizens 
too. Some of the criteria required to obtain Czech citizenship included five years of a 
clear criminal record (Article 7 also known as the “gypsy clause”) and proof of 
permanent residency. The Roma that were able to meet the stringent requirements were 
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sometimes indiscriminately denied citizenship by local officials.52 Additionally, during 
its fact-finding mission in the CZ, Human Rights Watch collected substantial evidence 
suggesting that Czech citizenship law was drafted with the specific intent of restricting 
the Roma population (e.g., the gypsy clause) from obtaining citizenship and has effected 
a highly discriminatory impact on Roma living in the Czech Republic.53 Denying 
individuals citizenship deprives them of economic and social benefits (e.g. voting rights, 
protection under the law, governmental aid), can leave them stateless, and encourages 
their abuse as scapegoats for things that go wrong in society.  
Crime. Many Czechs have stigmatized the Roma based on a popular belief that 
Roma are responsible for most of the crimes committed in the CZ. To add credibility to 
the stereotype, they often cite statistics such as: “In 2000, Roma accounted for over half 
of the prisoners in the Czech prison system despite accounting for a fraction of the 
overall Czech population.54 However, it is important to consider that Roma’s 
overrepresentation in prisons may be the result of economic and systemic discrimination.  
Some may argue that economic discrimination motivates Roma to commit 
robbery or petty theft—regardless of this argument—once Roma are arrested, their 
economic plight denies them the ability to afford lawyers or bail. The Roma defendants 
then face discrimination in the legal system where they are more likely to be convicted 
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and receive longer prison terms than non-Roma55 Jana Chalupová, ombudsman for 
former President Havel, acknowledges the widespread institutional racism and 
subsequent overrepresentation in prisons when she told Human Rights Watch/Helsinki 
that: “It's connected with the problem that they [Roma] are more criminalized. More 
often they are in prison. If you have a Czech boy and a Roma boy who commit the same 
crime, you can bet that the Roma boy will go to prison and the Czech boy will get a 
suspended sentence.56 Thus, the combination of economic and systemic discrimination 
creates a ripple effect—ultimately contributing to the high number of Roma in prison and 
encouraging the generalization of Roma criminal propensity. 
In 1992, The Project on Ethnic Relations reported that “the rate of conviction for 
theft is no higher among Roma than the national averages—and the rates for murder and 
rape are far lower.”57 Although this report concluded that Roma criminality is no more 
than average overall, the stereotype remains prevalent among Czechs and is still 
propagated by the media (who disproportionately report Roma crime).58 The lack of 
current, reliable demographic and social data (e.g., those currently registered as ethnically 
Roma number 13,150 although experts estimate there to be around 250,000) inhibits the 
ability to obtain current and accurate crime-related statistics that may help undermine the 
stereotype. 
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In May 1995, 43-year old Roma, Tibor Berki, was beaten to death with a baseball 
bat inside his South Moravian home in front of his five children. The four male attackers 
did not know Berki personally, but were overheard in a pub before the attack saying they 
would "get a Gypsy."59 The court ultimately ruled that there was no racial motivation for 
the attack since the men did not “utter any racial slurs while committing the murder.”60 
The “hate crime” garnered much-needed attention to the government’s previously 
lackadaisical approach to racially-motivated crimes. The law soon required stricter 
punishments for “hate crimes” and established a new police division specifically to tackle 
the issue. However, Roma continue to be the primary targets of “hate crimes” and 
violence by extremists and “skin heads” in the Czech Republic’s  
In 2015, OSCE reported 21 hate crimes motivated by bias against Roma, 
including: one physical assault, one case of damage to property, 12 cases of threats, one 
case of disturbance of the peace, and six cases of incitement to violence.61 This number is 
an increase from the 13 hate crimes that occurred the year before. Problems with this 
report arise when considering the persisting discrimination among the state police force. 
Some police have reportedly ignored criminal acts of extremists or individuals expressing 
racist, xenophobic and “Islamophobic” views in public.62 This form of discrimination not 
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only allows the intolerant criminals to act without fear of punishment, but can create a 
lack of trust in the victims toward the police.  
In 2016, The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination expressed its concern about continued racially motivated violence against 
Roma people and on the increase in racially-motivated violence against Muslim 
communities.63 The Ministry of the Interior’s quarterly report on extremism also noted 
concern for the rise of anti-migrant and anti-Islamic movements in the Czech Republic.64 
Although various reform campaigns have been launched to eliminate intolerance of the 
Roma, they continue to be victims of hate crimes. While the CZ has more work to do to 
resolve the issue, they are facing new targets of discrimination. 
Housing. While still under the communist regime, the Roma were guaranteed 
housing in state-provided apartment blocks. After its dissolution, the buildings the Roma 
occupied were sold into the real estate market and the Roma were collectively relocated 
to so-called “excluded localities” or ghettos. As the country began experiencing an 
overall increase in its standard of living—the Roma’s worsened. From 2006 to 2014, the 
number of excluded ghettos (typically one to a few houses in poor condition) doubled 
from 300 to 600 and the number of their inhabitants, mostly Romanies, increased from 
80,000 to 115,000.65 This illustrates that about half of the Roma population are suffering 
cramped, unsatisfactory living and health conditions. 
Due to their low income, the Roma often live on welfare and cannot afford decent 
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housing. As they continue to face social discrimination, many landlords refuse to rent 
long-term to gypsy tenants—if at all. According to the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, 
“65% of Czech Roma have experienced discrimination in housing access over the last 
five years. This is the second largest rate of all nine EU Member States where the survey 
was conducted.”66 Czech law prohibits housing discrimination based on ethnicity, but 
many owners will refuse to house Roma because of old prejudices that Roma tenants 
cause “slumification,” lower the value of property, and the fact that nine out of ten 
Czechs do not want to live next to a Roma.67 The challenge of not being able to secure 
long-term housing affects almost all aspects of Roma life as it is often a prerequisite for 
many social and economic rights (e.g., voting, citizenship, jobs). 
 Employment. The centralized government under communism demanded Roma 
employment. Although the forced assimilation was rejected by some, it was considered 
beneficial because it provided job security. After the fall of the Iron Curtain and the 
transition from communism to a free-market economy, the Roma faced discrimination in 
the labor market and high rates of unemployment. Although the Czech Republic has the 
lowest unemployment rate (four percent) in the EU, the Roma unemployment rate (ages 
15-64) was reported at 39% in 2010.6869 The lack of education and skillset reduces Roma 
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employability and makes it increasingly challenging for Roma to compete for the high-
skill jobs that typically pay better. However, even educated Roma have difficulty 
obtaining jobs due to the discrimination of employers. A survey of Roma reported they 
were discriminated against (within the last five years) 66 to 75% of the time when 
looking for work in the Czech Republic.70 The lack of fair job opportunities for Czech 
Roma is an unrelenting cycle, perpetuating their discrimination, and preventing them 
from improving both their social and economic situations. 
 
Czech Vietnamese 
After WWII, the Czech population decreased by about 25% to Edvard Beneš 
expulsion of over two million ethnic Germans.71 While under the Soviet regime, 
estimates suggest over 550,000 Czechoslovaks emigrated due to discontent under the 
oppressive communists.72 These mass emigrations created both gaps in the population 
and labor market. Relations between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (ČSSR) and 
Vietnam facilitated the migration of a small group of Vietnamese students and workers to 
the ČSSR in the 1950s and 1960s via Central Eastern Europe’s “fraternal assistance” 
package. Following the Vietnam War, cooperation between the two communist states 
increased and they (and other Eastern European states) signed Agreements on Mutual 
Help (1976 and 1977) creating relations based on “mutual assistance.” This encouraged 
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another (larger) influx of Vietnamese migrants into ČSSR which established close 
cultural, economic, and scientific cooperation.73 Vietnam’s membership in the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1978 furthered strengthened relations 
between the two countries. Although reunified, Vietnam’s war-torn economy suffered 
low labor productivity, modern technology, and trade potential resulting in the population 
of Vietnamese to increase to almost 40,000 by 1983.74 As a substitute for material trade, 
the Vietnamese migrants were primarily students and workers who helped fill vacant jobs 
in the ČSSR, but also benefited from receiving education and learning job-related skills, 
ultimately strengthening relations once again. Although the Vietnamese were largely 
segregated from the local population and experienced adverse working conditions, there 
was strong competition to obtain the opportunity. An example of this sentiment is shared 
by Phan, a Vietnamese migrant who initially worked in the steel mills in Ostrava (a city 
in north-eastern Czech Republic): “It was cold and very noisy. I was very sad. But my 
mother was very proud of me, because I had won the competition. My father had fallen in 
the war. Working and studying in Czechoslovakia was a reward for a few happy people.75 
By the end of the decade, the treaties and contracts expired, and the population 
temporarily decreased to around 10,000. After Czech’s liberation, the transition from 
managed migration transitioned into economic migration, effecting a resurgence of 
Vietnamese migrants over the next twenty years. 
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The Czech Vietnamese population has assimilated seemingly well (according the 
six benchmarks of assimilation) over the last few decades, but some latent discrimination 
exists among the native Czech population. However, most natives describe the 
Vietnamese as diligent workers, economically sufficient, prodigious students, and 
conflict-free. Current Czech President, Miloš Zeman, expressed his appreciation of the 
Vietnamese community whom he described as "a great example of diligence and 
entrepreneurial spirit."76  
Language and Education. The offer of free and compulsory education proved 
beneficial to Vietnamese children who are both more fluent and likely to attend 
secondary schools than the first generation.77 While economic and social opportunities 
motivate the Vietnamese to assimilate—their determination is also culturally driven.78 A 
research study conducted in 2007 concluded that, “Vietnamese children start basic 
education with the most serious language problems, but their family support and 
motivation helps them overcome this barrier relatively quickly.”79 Traditional 
Vietnamese parents encourage children to excel in school—where they are commonly 
considered auspicious learners. A teacher of basic school Vietnamese children in Cheb 
(west CZ) admits: “There are no problems at all with them. The opposite in fact. As 
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Czechs, we sometimes feel really ashamed. The Vietnamese need five minutes for the 
same exercise most of the Czech children will not finish in half an hour. Even their 
knowledge of Czech is superior.”80 The promising results of Czech Vietnamese 
performance in school are expected to be realized as the second generation begin to fill 
more professional-grade jobs such as: law, science, and medicine. 
Citizenship and Employment. After the temporary workers’ contracts expired at 
the end of the 1980s, the Vietnamese that remained in CZ obtained residence typically 
either through marriage or via trade licenses administered for the small businesses they 
owned. First-generation Vietnamese were often vendors of low-cost merchandise 
(typically clothing or shoes) in open-air markets. Fortunately, petty trading required little 
knowledge of the Czech language, allowing the first-generation to accomplish relative 
economic success. Although the vendors remain popular throughout CZ, the second-
generation Vietnamese ambition for better work and quality of life. Thus, they have more 
incentive to achieve Czech language fluency and citizenship.  
Recent census statistics show the Vietnamese population constitutes over 83,000 
people, accounting for the largest non-white population in the Czech Republic (the 
registered Roma population is 13,150—although estimates suggest there are closer to 
250,000). Of the estimated 83,000 Vietnamese residing in the Czech Republic, roughly 
60% possess permanent residence.81  
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Crime. The Vietnamese’s proficiency in Czech language, education, and 
economic self-sufficiency demonstrate fulfilling most of the benchmarks (housing 
information not provided) in the Czech Vietnamese assimilation process. However, there 
remains a small portion of the Czech Vietnamese who are involved in criminal activity—
primarily drug-related offenses. Although Czech criminal law does not consider drug use 
to be a criminal offense (as long the drug remains within the designated, non-criminal 
amount), the Czech Criminal Code (Act No. 40/2009) prohibits the unauthorized 
cultivation of plants containing narcotic and psychotropic substances and poisons.82 
Large-scale cannabis cultivation in the Czech Republic is increasingly dominated by 
Vietnamese groups whose drug-related convictions increased almost nine-fold from 
2008-2013.83 While this statistic can provoke the assumption that more crimes are being 
committed by the Vietnamese, the number of drug offenses reportedly remained the 
same—suggesting that more prosecutions were made and perhaps portraying a less 
negative image of the Vietnamese.  
 Similar to the discrimination Czech Roma receive, the media tends to focus on 
Vietnamese criminals, prompting a negative image of the population.84 Additionally, in 
2016, 60% of the Czech drug crime detectives began focusing specifically on Vietnamese 
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drug crime, than on all criminal groups.85 While focusing on the primary ethnic group 
committing drug-related crimes may result in more convictions, this discriminatory 
approach can also lead to racial profiling, wrongful arrests, incite more prejudice against 
Vietnamese, and instill distrust between the Vietnamese and the police.  
 
Perceptions of Czech Roma versus Vietnamese 
Often comparisons are made between the Czech Vietnamese and Roma 
populations due to being the two most populous non-white ethnic minorities in Czech. A 
survey conducted in 2007 conducted by the Public Opinion Research Centre of the 
Academy of Sciences, attitudes toward ethnonational groups were rated on a scale from 
one to seven (best attitude to worst). The Vietnamese received an average value of 4.19 
and the Roma 5.52—the worst of all the rated minorities.86 Therefore, although both 
Roma and Vietnamese face some form of discrimination from the Czech people—both 
minorities are targeted by Czech media for their criminality and by xenophobes who 
abuse them as scapegoats—the Roma experience notably less tolerance than the 
Vietnamese. Czech senator, Jaroslav Doubrava, expresses a common perception: “The 
Vietnamese are definitely not saints, but any crime in their communities is an anomaly, a 
fringe phenomenon. They work, they send their children to school properly, they take 
care of one another and they don't cause problems, unlike the Roma. In the Vietnamese 
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community crime is an exception, but for the Gypsies it's the rule.”87  
One explanation for the contrasting perceptions is that each group has achieved 
different levels of progress towards assimilation. The Roma ostensibly lag the 
Vietnamese in every suggested benchmark (sans housing for Vietnamese due to lack of 
data): language, education, citizenship, crime, and employment—underlining the 
stereotype of Roma as uneducated, unsuccessful, criminals. In an online discussion of the 
groups, an anonymous contributor asserted: "It's interesting that most Vietnamese have 
jobs and most Roma do not! How many Roma and how many Vietnamese graduate from 
college every year? Lots of Vietnamese and almost no Roma! Both have the same 
conditions - isn't the flaw in the Roma mentality? I think so."88  
The Roma’s lack of progress within Czech society are often attributed to their 
genetic propensity for crime, unique dialect, historically nomadic lifestyle, traditions in 
magic and fortune telling, and darker complexions. Collectively, these stereotypes and a 
history of persecution—dating back to the Habsburg Empire—contribute to a general 
perception of: “otherness” and “us” versus “them.” The Roma diaspora in Europe retains 
no claimed homeland although they originate from the northwestern regions of the Indian 
subcontinent. Lacking a tangible motherland further perpetuates their image as outsiders; 
and subsequently, they lack a national government—which denies them the authority to 
make demands. Although the Vietnamese also possess a unique language, culture, and 
physical appearance, they share a history of “mutual assistance” with the Czechs that 
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began under the communist regime. The different manners in which both minorities 
arrived in the CZ subsequently created contrasting impressions on the Czech historical 
narrative. In the same online discussion, another contributor rhetorically asked: "Why, for 
example, have the Vietnamese, who have been here only several decades, integrated so 
completely successfully into society while the Roma, who have been in Europe for 
several centuries already, still haven't?"89 The paradox arises in that it is perhaps due to 
their lengthy history in Czech that the negative perception of Roma is so firmly cemented 
in the Czech ethos.  
 The negative image of the Roma dates to their arrival in the Czech lands during 
the 15th century, and worsened when the Soviets forced their migration during the mid-
20th century as a cheap labor force. Although the Vietnamese also migrated to the then-
ČSSR as a labor force, it was facilitated through various economic agreements between 
the two communist countries. The temporary labor agreements were often perceived by 
the Vietnamese as an opportunity to improve their education or work skillset, but also 
provided the Vietnamese with confidence in the eventuality that they would return home. 
In contrast, the Roma’s migration was permanent and without the possibility of returning 
to their former life. Overall, the arrival of the Vietnamese was perceived as a mutually 
beneficial “invitation” and were not pressured to assimilate. The Roma—who were to 
remain indefinitely—were forced to conform, and forfeit their lifestyle and culture. The 
contrasting historical experiences of the two groups has affected their both their current 
outlook and ability to integrate. Facing less persecution during their first waves of 
migration, the next wave of Vietnamese labor migrants—and those that remained after 
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the treaties expired—endeavored to integrate into the newly liberated Czech Republic. 
The Vietnamese’s efforts starkly contrast the Roma’s who prove unable to overcome a 
history of Czech prejudice. One area where neither Roma nor Vietnamese are immune is 
in the media’s disproportionate reporting on foreign minority crime and the police’s 
inconsistent prosecution of hate crimes against two ethnic groups. Although Czech media 
perceives the Roma much more negatively than the Vietnamese, both are affected by the 
systemic discrimination which further fuels the public’s prejudice of the minorities. 
 
Summary 
The study of both the Czech Roma and Vietnamese populations are pertinent in 
considering the evolution of Czech’s historical fear of outsiders, into the xenophobia and 
discrimination that exists today. The xenophobic, anti-immigrant sentiment prevents both 
the Czech public and political elite to empathize with outsiders and thus, inhibits the 
ability of the two groups to fully integrate into Czech society. Hence, future non-white 
immigrants may potentially endure a similarly poor rate of assimilation.  
The Security Strategy of the Czech Republic 2015 advocates the mitigation of 
potential risks of migration by integrating immigrants into the Czech Republic and “seeks 
to consistently detect and prosecute manifestations of extremism, including xenophobia, 
racism and other forms of intolerance and discrimination.”90 However, shortcomings in 
this stated commitment are exposed when considering the assimilation progress of both 
Czech Roma and Vietnamese. While each population experienced differing levels of 
progress, both undeniably experienced discrimination. Ultimately, this study offers a 
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sobering perspective of not only Czech attitudes and perceptions of both current and 
potential non-white immigrants, but propounds the unlikelihood of additional non-white 
immigrants to successfully assimilate or benefit from migrating to the Czech Republic. 
Chapter Two’s discussion of the historically deep-seated xenophobia within the Czech 
identity is evinced in Chapter Three’s study of the Czech Roma and Vietnamese. Chapter 
Four then utilizes both the historic narrative and the study as a vantage point for 
understanding Czech’s contemporary immigration policies and aversion to Muslim 
immigrants—especially in comparison to Western Europe’s traditional liberal policies. 
This thesis’ aim relies upon both the historic understanding of Czech perceptions and the 
study of the integration of the Czech Roma and Vietnamese to predict the assimilation 
potential of future non-white immigrants, to understand how its historic narratives 
influence contemporary Czech politics, and ultimately to predict the future swing of 
European politics. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: MUSLIM IMMIGRATION AND EU INTEGRATION 
 
As Chapter Two indicated, analyzing both the Czech Roma and Vietnamese 
populations’ assimilation progress may help to predict the assimilation potential Muslims 
may have in CZ. With the onset of the European Migrant Crisis in 2015, this became an 
increasingly pertinent topic as EU member states struggled to determine how to fairly 
distribute the large number of incoming refugees amassing primarily in Italy and Greece. 
The EU’s solution was outlined in the European Agenda on Migration. However, this 
mandate was not achieved through consensus among EU states. The xenophobic—or 
aptly “Islamophobic”—Czech officials refused to abide by the EU-mandated 
redistribution plan and accompanied quota of refugees assigned to the Czech Republic. 
The dissent of the Czech Republic and remaining V4 states, highlights the divisiveness of 
the topic of Muslim immigration among the “Eastern bloc” with the proponents of the 
plan in Western Europe. 
This chapter examines the historical immigration of Western Europe (compared 
with that of Eastern Europe), current V4 perspectives on coping with the Migrant Crisis 
(including the influence of leaders and the media), and the trend of rising populist 
governments. It also discusses Eurosceptic, Islamophobic, politicians who exploit the 
increasing fear of Islamist terrorism (across all of Europe) to garner public support for 
their policies and governments. Finally, this chapter underscores the vehemence with 
which Czech leaders are committed to their anti-Muslim and limited integration policies 
due to their historic and cultural narratives, with which they are determined to challenge 
the historically liberal policies of the EU. Ultimately, as right-wing politicians gain 
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popularity in Central and Eastern Europe and a consensual solution to future Muslim 
immigration is want, this chapter addresses the thesis’ overarching assertion that Czech’s 
historic xenophobia and current anti-Muslim immigration stance are likely to propagate 
the rising populism. 
 
Historical Immigration within the European Union  
The increased immigration seen within the Czech Republic over the past couple 
decades is a fraction of the amount of immigration experienced throughout Western 
Europe. As it struggled to recover from WWII, western Europe welcomed an influx of 
labor immigrants that helped rebuild the war-torn economies. Following the introduction 
of the free-travel Schengen Agreement, contemporary globalization, and prosperous 
western economies, immigration became easier, faster, and more attractive than before. 
Although the EU is developing a common immigration policy for its members states, 
each EU country maintains individual immigration policies (given they do not interfere 
with EU directives) that influence the number of immigrants they receive. Germany, UK, 
France, and Spain have a history of lax immigration policies and now retain the largest 
number of international migrants in northern and western Europe—and some of the 
largest in the world.91 The increase in multicultural populations is accompanied by rising 
anti-immigration sentiments in recent years.  
The steady increase of the Muslim population in Europe (892 million total 
                                                 
91 “International Migration Report 2013,” United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Population Division, NY: United Nations, 2013. 
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population) in recent decades, is projected to continue through 2030.92 Muslims currently 
maintain substantial populations in several countries (e.g. France, UK, the Netherlands, 
Sweden) but Germany and France are home to the largest: 5.8% of the German 
population (Germany’s totally population is 81.4 million) and 7.5% of France (66.8 
million).93 Increasingly popular debates within these (and other western European) 
countries often surround the ability to integrate the Muslim populations into society. The 
terror attacks experienced in western Europe—like those in Paris 2015 which resulted in 
the deaths of 130 people—are heartbreaking indications that it has failed the multicultural 
challenge. Unfortunately, these tragic attacks are also on the rise. Per the Global 
Terrorism Database, although the overall number of terrorist incidents declined in 
western Europe in 2016, the attacks resulting in fatalities increased (30 attacks in 2016, 
up from 23 in 2015), confirming that attacks have become deadlier (an average of 26.5 
deaths in both 2015 and 2016 compared to an average of four for 2012-2014).94 The 
emotions following these events has stirred a security debate throughout Europe, with 
anti-immigrant proponents demanding the restriction of free movement across borders. 
New immigration challenges plague Europe as it experiences unprecedented waves of 
immigrants and asylum seekers in the European Migrant Crisis. 
 
                                                 
92 Conrad Hackett, “5 Facts About the Muslim Population in Europe," Pew Research Center, 19 
July 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/19/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-
europe/. 
 
93 Ibid. 
 
94 Mark Hanrahan and Jessica Wang, "Number of Fatal Terrorist Attacks in Western Europe 
Increasing, Data Show," Reuters, 12 July 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-attacks/number-
of-fatal-terrorist-attacks-in-western-europe-increasing-data-show-idUSKBN19X1QO. 
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European Migrant Crisis 
 Starting in 2015, an extraordinary number of migrants surged into EU countries. 
Over 60 million refugees fleeing various Asian and African countries represent the 
greatest number of forcibly displaced refugees since WWII. Eurostat determined asylum 
applications more than doubled from 2014 (626,960) to 2015 (1,322,825), and slightly 
decreased in 2016 (1,260,630).  One of the many challenges caused by the overwhelming 
number of migrants, is the asylum applications are not spread evenly throughout EU 
states—they concentrate in a handful of selected countries. The first quarter of 2017 
reported that Germany, Italy, France, and Italy combined to account for 80% of all first-
time applicants in the EU.95 The refugees caused by the ongoing conflict in Syria and 
continuing proliferation of violence in the Middle East are unlikely to experience much 
relief in the short term. 
Most of the applicants originate from the Muslim-majority countries: Syria, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq.96 Although most are presumed to be fleeing their conflict-ridden 
countries, some applicants are also economic migrants and Islamic-state militants 
(disguised as refugees). Many of them set out for Europe by boat—navigating the 
western Balkan route through the Mediterranean Sea and enter via either Greece or Italy 
(although, Spain is increasingly popular). The International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) estimates that more than 1,011,700 migrants arrived by sea in 2015, and almost 
                                                 
95 “Asylum and First Time Asylum Applicants by Citizenship, Age, and Sex,” Eurostat Data, 9 
August 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_quarterly_report. 
 
96 Ibid. 
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34,900 by land.97 The migrants attempt the perilous journey and risk their lives in the 
process. 2016 witnessed the worst annual death toll of those attempting to cross the 
Mediterranean, reaching 5,000 people. The exponential increase at which the refugees 
were fleeing subsequently increased the probability for drownings, smuggling, and illegal 
entry into the EU. To minimize the effects, EU countries responded by increasing border 
patrols and intensifying search and rescue efforts—including both adding resources and 
expanding the patrol areas of EU border police in the Mediterranean (i.e., Operation 
Triton). Additionally, the tendency of migrants to enter the EU through southern Europe 
has put an unfair share of responsibility on the most popular countries-of-origin to 
process asylum applicants—a requirement of the Dublin III Regulation. Further, those 
countries lack effective controls to prevent asylum seekers from heading north under the 
free-travel Schengen Agreement to eventually arrive at more desirable destinations like 
Germany and Sweden. The migration crisis emphasized the shortcomings of the two 
agreements and demanded a solution to improve their efficiency and effectiveness. The 
outcome resulted in the adoption of the controversial European Agenda on Migration. 
European Agenda on Migration. EU Interior Ministers endeavored to alleviate 
the burden on those countries impacted by the Dublin Regulation and Schengen 
Agreement during the height of the migrant crisis in 2015—mainly those external border 
countries where immigrants are overcrowding reception centers. They proposed a 
burden-sharing scheme that outlined a redistribution of a total of 160,000 migrants across 
EU states, away from Greece and Italy (Hungary declined participation). Although some 
                                                 
97 "Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts," BBC News, 4 March 2016, 
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member states—primarily in eastern Europe—lambasted the plan for placing unfair 
burden on their states (and others unprepared for the immigrants), almost 50% of the 
asylum-seekers to be redistributed were set to be relocated to Germany and France, 
alone.98 The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary voted against it, while Finland 
abstained—Poland voted for the plan but following its election in 2015, its stance 
shifted). The plan was approved by majority vote instead of consensus—the typical 
means for determining sensitive issues and was considered politically unacceptable by 
some states. One of those critics was Slovakia’s Prime Minister, Robert Fico, who 
defiantly rebuked the scheme in 2016 claiming, "As long as I am prime minister, 
mandatory quotas will not be implemented on Slovak territory."99 Regardless, the 
relocation scheme was implemented and became obligatory under EU law. Under the 
redistribution plan, the Visegrád countries are to accept 11,069 refugees total or face 
250,000-euro-per-migrant fines. The breakdown and those effectively relocated by 4 
September 2017 are represented in Table 1.    
 Although the relocation plan was implemented in September 2015, by 2017, the 
V4 has accepted only 28 of the 11,069 stipulated. After voting down the plan, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland (originally voted in favor) and Slovakia have adamantly 
refused to abide its mandate (Romania has been accepting relocated migrants). While 
Czech officials accused the plan of being ineffective and Poland claimed it had a “moral 
right” to reject incoming refugee populations, both Hungary and Slovakia took their 
 
 
                                                 
98 Vince Chadwick, "Robert Fico: ‘Islam has No Place in Slovakia’," POLITICO, 26 May 2016, 
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Table 1. Relocations from Italy and Greece by 4 September 2017. 
 
Member State Effectively 
relocated from 
Italy 
Effectively 
relocated from 
Greece 
Total 
effectively 
relocated 
Commitment legally 
foreseen in the Council 
decisions 
 
Austria 15  15 1953 
Belgium 259 677 936 3812 
Bulgaria  50 50 1302 
Croatia 18 60 78 968 
Cyprus 34 96 130 320 
Czech Republic  12 12 2691 
Estonia  141 141 329 
Finland 755 1196 1951 2078 
France 330 3948 4278 19714 
Germany 3405 4447 7852 27536 
Hungary   0 1294 
Iceland   0  
Ireland  487 487 600 
Latvia 27 294 321 481 
Liechtenstein  10 10  
Lithuania 27 355 382 671 
Luxembourg 111 271 382 557 
Malta 47 101 148 131 
Netherlands 762 1595 2357 5947 
Norway 815 693 1508  
Poland   0 6182 
Portugal 299 1116 1415 2951 
Romania 45 682 727 4180 
Slovakia  16 16 902 
Slovenia 45 172 217 567 
Spain 168 1089 1257 9323 
Sweden 511 1392 1903 3766 
Switzerland 778 344 1122  
Total 8,451 19,244 27,695 98,255 
 
Source: "Annex 3: Relocations from Italy and Greece by 4 September 2017," Commission to the European 
Parliament, the European Council, and the Council, 6 September 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-3081_en.htm. 
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opposition a step further when they challenged the plan’s legitimacy before the EU’s 
highest court and appealed for its annulment. 100 They did not challenge the mandatory 
number of refugees, but accused the plan of infringing on state sovereignty. Czech 
Republic and Romania did not participate in the challenge—neither questioned the 
validity of the decision-making of the plan—but Poland publicly supported Hungary and 
Slovakia’s appeal. 
 Early September 2017, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) stated that the 
majority-vote (rather than census) was justifiable as an emergency measure—given the 
urgent situation—and reiterated that the plan’s burden-sharing system was effectively 
alleviating the situations in both Italy and Greece. Ultimately, the court ruled against 
Hungary and Slovakia’s challenge and warned them (and the whole V4) to immediately 
accept the mandatory refugees—or that they may face legal action.101 In response, 
Slovakia decried the court’s decision—as it remains unconvinced of the Agenda’s 
effectiveness—but respected the ruling and ultimately consented to accept some refugees. 
Slovakia’s Fico may have finally submitted to the mandatory quota, but remains a critic 
of the plan. Following the verdict, he said, “We fully respect the verdict of the European 
Court of Justice," but that his government's negative stance on the relocation plan "has 
                                                 
100 Agnieszka Barteczko and Pawel Sobczak, "Poland Did Not Invite Refugees, Has Right to Say 
'No' – Kaczynski," Reuters, 1 July 2017, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-poland-migrants/poland-did-not-
invite-refugees-has-right-to-say-no-kaczynski-idUKKBN19M3HI. “We have not exploited the countries 
from which these refugees are coming to Europe these days, we have not used their labour force and finally 
we have not invited them to Europe. We have a full moral right to say ‘no’,” Kaczynski said in a speech 
broadcast on television.”-Jaroslaw Kaczynski. 
 
101 Pablo Gorondi and Lorne Cook, "EU Court Rejects Hungary-Slovakia Appeal of Refugee 
Quotas," Ledger-Enquirer, 6 September 2017, http://www.ledger-
enquirer.com/news/business/article171465227.html. 
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not changed at all."102 
Nevertheless, the other three countries did not submit so easily. Czech President 
Miloš Zeman defiantly insisted that the Czech Republic would not yield to the court’s 
verdict as their position—doubting the plan’s effectiveness—remained unchanged. 
Furthermore, Zeman boldly suggested that the CZ should give up EU subsidies before 
submitting to the binding refugee quotas.103 Hungary’s Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó 
also criticized the court for its ruling and accused it of blackmailing the states (who 
refused to abide by the plan) with infringement procedures. He persisted that European 
Commission (EC) had overstepped its authority, “Not even the EC can take away member 
states’ right to decide whom they want to let into their country and whom they want to 
live together with.”104 Lastly, Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydło’s response the court’s 
verdict echoes both Czech’s and Hungary’s obstinate sentiments: “This absolutely does 
not change the position of the Polish government with respect to migration policy.”105   
As the ECJ warned following its verdict, the refusal of the three countries to 
acquiesce to the mandate renders them liable for prosecution under EU law. Infringement 
proceedings already began against the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, began in 
July 2017 because the Czech Republic had not relocated anyone since August 2016 and 
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neither Hungary nor Poland took any refugees at all. Since the decision was made to 
uphold the quota plan, the three countries may soon face the final steps of the 
infringement procedure—court referral. If found guilty of breaking EU law, the three are 
likely to face fines. However, additional sanctions and the possibility of revoking EU 
membership have been suggested—to which German Chancellor, Angela Merkel 
responded with uncertainty, “We will have to talk about this at the European Council in 
October.”106 Although the three countries in question have a few weeks to reconsider 
their stances—based on the fiery rhetoric issued from Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw 
recently—the probability of that happening for any one of the three, is nearly 
unbelievable.  
Even though Slovakia eventually acquiesced to the requirements of the Agenda—
relieving it from infringement proceedings—its condemnation of the quota plan continues 
to unite it with the other three members of the V4. The small dissenting group is 
outnumbered by the other member states who favor the plan, —powerful, western 
European states like France, Germany, and Italy—tout “solidarity,” and consider the ECJ 
ruling a victory over the group of four.107 The quota plan drew contrasting opinions 
between the V4 and the other EU members and was the catalyst reigniting a deeply 
divisive issue between central and western Europe—Muslim immigration.  
  
                                                 
106 Michael Nienaber, "Merkel Calls on Hungary to Implement Court Ruling on Refugee 
Distribution," Reuters, 11 September 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-germany-
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Visegrád Four Perspectives 
The shared sentiment of the Visegrád Four regarding Muslim immigration can 
somewhat be explained by its common historical experience. Although the alliance 
formed following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, their ties date back centuries. All 
four were ruled under the Habsburg Empire at one time or another and were all part of 
the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War. The creation of the regional alliance in 1991 
solidified relations between the four—united by their shared historical, political, and 
cultural values. Since then, all four have joined both NATO and the EU, demonstrating 
their successful transition into democratic institutions. 
Although now fully integrated into alliances with the West, the history of the V4 
has uniquely shaped its identity compared to western Europe. After WWII, western 
Europe imported immigrants from Africa and Asia and now contain diverse populations. 
In contrast, the countries of Central Europe did not experience mass immigration and 
thus, maintain primarily homogeneous populations. While the bloc has successfully 
integrated some immigrant populations (e.g., Ukrainian, Vietnamese, and Balkan)—even 
those populations are mostly ethnically white. Therefore, its apprehension of mass 
immigration—specifically Muslim immigration—emanates from a historical lack of 
exposure to diverse populations and a sense of xenophobia. The V4’s aversion to 
“outsiders” encourages the bloc to value the ability to both control its borders and 
preserve its ethnic identities. This is indicative in its position on the current migrant 
crisis.  
In response to the millions of Muslim refugees flooding into Europe, the V4 
advocated both increased policing of the EU’s external borders and assistance to conflict 
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areas—instead of the 2015 quota scheme. It complained that the Agenda was not an 
effective mechanism and undermined state sovereignty. Some may believe the V4’s 
complaints derive from its repugnance to policies imposed by outside powers—which the 
bloc experienced while under authoritarian regimes. However, since becoming NATO 
and EU members, the V4 rarely challenged the decisions of the supranational 
organizations. The current crisis and subsequent redistribution agenda was enough to 
upset the former status quo. Otilia Dhand, a Slovakian-born analyst with Teneo 
Intelligence, confirms the surprise caused by the group’s push-back, “The emergence of 
the Visegrád Four as an opposition bloc is a notable development…since these countries 
could long be relied on to “sign on the dotted line” of EU policies.”108 The V4’s 
xenophobia and hostility towards the massive numbers of refugees impelled them to both 
publicly oppose the EU scheme and challenge its adoption procedure in the EU’s highest 
court. The complaint it brought against the scheme revealed the bloc’s unflinching 
conviction that accepting the (mostly Muslim) refugees would threaten state security and 
all Europe’s—aggravating the already-divisive debate on Muslim immigration.109  
The V4 share the perception that efforts to integrate Muslim immigrant 
populations in Western Europe have failed.110 This perception is also shared among the 
populations of the V4 countries who maintain the most negative views of Muslims across 
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Europe, according to a Pew Research Poll.111 The same poll concluded that the central 
European countries believe the incoming refugees will cause social and economic 
problems and increase Muslim-related terrorism (although, this trend is increasing 
throughout Europe).112 Therefore the bloc not only raises concern only over Muslim 
refugees who may alter the cultural identity and have negative economic impacts, but 
asserts that terrorists may be disguised as refugees. The V4’s loudest critic of the quota 
plan, Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, echoed this concern while discussing the 
relation between Western European immigration and the rise in terrorism, “Migration 
turned out to be the Trojan horse of terrorism.”113  
Other anti-refugee proponents sometimes assert a correlation between Muslim 
populations and terrorism based on the central European countries—who have small 
Muslim populations, and no recent terror attacks.114 The V4 countries’ individual Muslim 
populations are considerably smaller than those of western Europe. As of 2010, the 
Muslim populations as a percentage of total population of the V4 countries are: Slovakia: 
0.1%, Poland: 0.1%, Hungary: 0.3%, and Czech Republic: less than 0.1%.115 According 
to the same poll, the V4’s Muslim populations are not expected to change by 2030. A 
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different poll regarding terror threat levels throughout the world, the V4 collectively face 
a “low” terror threat level and ranked at a terror threat “level 1” (Slovakia remains at a 
level 2 which is still considered low).116 Although the population predictions were made 
prior to the 2015 migrant crisis, if the bloc continues to rebuke the redistribution 
scheme—or even if they accept a small number of refugees—the prediction is likely to 
remain valid. The effects on the number of future terror attacks was not mentioned in the 
study, but those advocating the correlation between Muslim populations and terror 
attacks, would likely predict them to remain low too. The seemingly causal relationship 
and the rise in terror attacks through western Europe, are used to justify the V4’s 
opposition to accepting Muslim refugees—and thus, the quota plan.  
While naturally, not every refugee is Muslim, and not every Muslim will commit 
an act of terror, the V4 is unwilling to challenge the probability and risk the security of its 
populations. Apart from Slovakia, the V4 bloc continues to refuse refugees even after 
threatened with fines and sanctions and are unlikely to succumb to “solidarity” pressures 
from the west. As it continues to challenge the European Agenda on Migration, the 
obdurate leaders garner support from their xenophobic populations by propagating anti-
Muslim and anti-refugee sentiments.  
 
Czech Republic Perspective 
Security Strategy of the Czech Republic. A poll conducted by the International 
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Republican Institute indicates Czechs consider immigration as the single biggest problem 
facing Europe today and one of the greatest threats to their way of life (second only to 
terrorism).117 Therefore, at the time of the Czech Security Strategy’s formulation in 2015, 
the European Migrant Crisis was quickly becoming one of the most important and 
publicized security concerns, and designated the “negative aspects of international 
migration” as security threat. It also described the dangerous implications of “mass 
uncontrollable migration” along with proclaiming its intolerance for xenophobia and 
racism.118 It speculates that insufficient integration of migrants causes not only a rise in 
social tensions, but can ultimately result in the radicalization of the immigrants.119 It then 
continues to make various suggestions to counter illegal immigration, some of which 
include: denouncing the abolition of internal border controls (which the CZ deems vital 
in the fight against illegal immigration), demanding greater protection of the EU’s 
external borders, and confirming its support for both the Dublin System and Schengen 
Agreement—specifically when implemented consistently by all of the European states.120 
The Strategy also outlines its commitment to prosecute extremism, xenophobia, 
discrimination, and other forms of intolerance that target minority or immigrant groups—
stating that the CZ aims for the social and economic self-sufficiency of immigrants, and 
their overall integration into Czech society.121 Although the attitude of the Strategy 
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begins by asserting that immigrants are potentially dangerous, it ends with a tone of 
cooperation and aims for integration. Since the Security Strategy was implemented, 
leaders in Prague have indicated their denunciation and refusal to cooperate with the EU 
on its Agenda on Migration. While they cite reasons that do not necessarily interfere with 
the Security Strategy, Czech leaders often publicly propagate Islamophobic propaganda 
and fear that Muslim refugees are terrorists in disguise. This behavior is explicitly 
condemned within the Strategy, yet leaders have not been prosecuted. In the wake of the 
migrant crisis, the Czech Republic has proved itself to be one of the most vocal critics of 
mass Muslim immigration and thus, successfully undermined its own inclusive policies. 
Czech and Islam. Since the implementation of the European Agenda on 
Migration, the Czech Republic accepted twelve of the required 2,691 refugees. The 
Czech Republic’s common history with the V4—oppression and invasion by outsiders, a 
lack of diversity, and xenophobic disposition—similarly motivates its obstinacy amid 
threats from the EU to adhere to the quota plan. The Czech Republic also shares concerns 
that Muslim refugees will affect an increase in terrorism and doubts the compatibility of 
Islam with the culture of the V4.  
The Czech census in 2009 showed 407,500 foreign citizens reside in the CZ (most 
of which are white) out of a population of 10.55 million.122 While this foreign population 
is small in comparison to western populations, it shows that Czech is not opposed to all 
immigrants. Rather, CZ specifically opposes immigrants that are Muslim. Per the 2010 
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census, 4,000 Muslims live in Czech Republic.123 Therefore, although the CZ is home to 
a small Muslim community, Czechs believe any substantial Muslim population will prove 
unable or unwilling to assimilate into CZ. In the past, the CZ has successfully assimilated 
Ukrainian and Vietnamese communities, and offered protection for refugees from the 
Balkans. Today, Czechs have a poor outlook on the possibility of successful Muslim 
assimilation. In 2015, Czech President Miloš Zeman explained his viewpoint, 
“Ukrainians, too, are refugees and with their origin and diligence, they are somewhat 
close to us.... unlike the Islamic ones, they have a much a better ability to assimilate 
themselves.”124 Zeman again, persisted that Islam is incompatible with Czech culture, in 
2017, when he praised "immigrants who come here to work and who have similar 
language and similar culture like ours," applauding both the Ukrainian and Vietnamese 
immigrant communities, noting they assimilate well, and are appreciative of and 
contributive to, Czech culture and society.125 If Czechs believe Islam is incompatible with 
their culture and will not assimilate, they are likely to believe that a large Muslim 
population would change the overall culture of CZ. This fear is common among most 
Europeans (including western) who believe that the Muslims residing in their countries, 
do not want to adopt their countries’ customs or way of life, and want to remain distinct 
from the majority society.126 Whether this is true in the Muslim mindset, the fear and 
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possibility of losing their identity and culture to Islam is an unthinkable risk. 
Although the CZ and remaining V4 cite similar explanations for their aversion to 
immigrate large Muslim populations, Czech culture has a distinct characteristic that 
further undermines any desire for Muslim assimilation—secularism. The other three 
countries that comprise the V4, possess considerably more religious populations than the 
Czech Republic—who is one of the least religious nations in the world. The Czech 
Constitution allows freedom of religion and historically, Czechs were considered 
“tolerant and even indifferent towards religion.”127 However, the CZ continues its process 
of secularization and would likely consider the attempt of any religion to impede on that 
process as unfavorable. On the other hand, because most refugees are Muslims, it may be 
difficult for them to assimilate under a secular government. For example, although 
Syria’s Constitution claims to be a secular state, its Article 3 stipulates that the President 
must be a Muslim, and that the majority of laws will be based on Islam.128 CZ’s 
dramatically different government and mostly non-religious population may prove 
exceedingly challenging for a Syrian, who is accustomed to a government that is largely 
dictated by religion. Czech Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka, asserts his belief that 
religious and cultural convictions cause populations to clash in saying, “In Europe too 
often we see problems with the integration of people coming from another cultural or 
religious environment.”129 
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In 2004, Islam was officially registered as a religion in CZ and is now eligible to 
receive state funds. Although there are currently two mosques, the public has opposed the 
construction of any additional mosques. Perhaps worse, Islamophobic Czechs participate 
in various public events displaying hate for Muslims. One of the recent, notable events 
occurred on the anniversary of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
20 August, 2016, anti-Islamic activists of Martin Konvička Initiative (MKI) 
staged an Islamic State invasion at the Old Town Square in Prague. Konvička, 
dressed in the white garb of a Muslim imam, drove into the tourist-packed Old 
Town Square in a jeep, accompanied by a camel and a group of “DAESH 
soldiers” dressed in army fatigues, brandishing imitation firearms and shouting 
“Allahu Akbar.”130 
 
The event caused panic and alarm, motivating some people to take cover—causing minor 
injuries. The fake attack was quickly shut down by police and demonstrators were 
arrested. However, Prague Metropolitan Police Spokesperson Tomáš Hulan, confirmed 
the organizers received permission from City Hall for both a “performance” and the use 
of imitation firearms. The demonstrators were later released.131 Although some Czech 
politicians publicly decried the simulation, it has not prevented other displays of 
Islamophobia, or settled the anxieties of potential Islamic terrorism—that is often fanned 
by both the media and Czech leaders. As legislative elections passed in October and 
presidential elections are upcoming in January, anti-immigration and opposition to the 
EU quota plan are two of the most influential topics candidates can campaign on to 
garner support.  
President Miloš Zeman. Throughout Czech history, reverence has been paid to 
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its various leaders who contributed to the state it is today. Beginning with Jan Hus and 
the Hussite Movement that planted the seeds of Czech nationalism, to Czechoslovakia’s 
first President Tomáš Masaryk, and his successors: Václav Havel, Václav Klaus, and 
current Czech President Miloš Zeman. These leaders (among others of the Czech 
intelligentsia) are attributed with helping to shape Czech identity, achieve independence, 
and shape the policies that continue to maintain Czech sovereignty. Therefore, it may be 
unsurprising that even current Czech President Miloš Zeman’s controversial presidency 
benefits from the respect from the Czech population—permitting him to maintain mostly 
above a 50% approval rating since mid-2015.132  
Zeman boasts political tenure dating back to the Prague Spring of 1968, was 
Czech’s former Prime Minister from 1998-2001, and is Czech’s first directly elected 
president (the previous two were elected by parliament). Zeman’s years in politics and 
current presidential term are marked by his outspoken, politically-charged, and 
sometimes inaccurate statements that are often granted credence because he is a Czech 
political elite. Zeman’s controversial rhetoric and popularity will be tested as Zeman runs 
for his second term in the upcoming national election in January 2018. He successfully 
campaigned in 2012 on issues of national security, anti-corruption measures, accession to 
the eurozone, and the appointment of judges and presidential pardons of convicts. 
However, as geopolitics have shifted toward the topics of EU integration and Muslim 
immigration, his current campaign reflects those accordingly. He openly expresses his 
desire to remain within both the EU and NATO, but takes hardline approaches against 
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both mass immigration and Islam—including challenging Brussels’ quota plan.  
The European Migrant Crisis served as a catalyst for Zeman’s xenophobic, 
discriminatory propaganda, where he offers misleading quips like, “Not all Muslims are 
terrorists, but all terrorists are Muslims.”133 Although Zeman’s government decided 
against challenging the quota plan in court, he remained a vocal critic, and refused to be 
forced to accept the required number of refugees. He justified this decision to the Czech 
people by peddling anti-refugee, Islamophobic rhetoric reigniting Czech paranoia, and 
condemning the foreign group as “criminals” who intend to “subjugate Europe.”134135 
With Czech’s long and recent history of subjugation by foreign powers, this ostensible 
fear pangs at the core of the Czech conscious.  
Although this anti-Muslim rhetoric has retained his popularity in rural areas, his 
approval ratings and urban voter support have both recently dropped following the 
controversy surrounding Babiš’ removal from office in May. 136 Under Czech law, Zeman 
should have approved Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka’s demand that Finance Minister 
Andrei Babiš be terminated for tax dodging. Therefore, when Zeman refused to abide by 
Sobotka’s plans, it was seen as an abuse of power. Even with this recent decrease in 
approval ratings, Zeman is still a leading candidate for the January presidential election—
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especially due to his close relationship with Andrei Babiš. 
Andrej Babiš. President Zeman’s former Finance Minister (his employment was 
terminated in May 2017 following a tax evasion scandal), Andrej Babiš, is a Slovak-born 
oligarch, and one of Czech Republic’s richest and most popular politicians. Despite his 
termination in May and investigations beginning in September for illegally procuring 
government subsidies, both his popularity and anti-immigrant platform procured him a 
substantial victory in the October legislative elections (by a margin of over 30% from the 
next leading candidate’s votes). His populist parties’ anti-immigration and Eurosceptic 
politics have potentially great implications for the Czech Republic and its role within the 
EU. 
Babiš is the founder of the populist party, Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (Akce 
nespokojených občanů, ANO). In addition to Agrofert—his agriculture, food processing, 
and chemical holding company for which he is sole owner—Babiš also owns Mafra, the 
largest media distribution company in the country. Mafra distributes some of the most 
widely read newspapers, such as Mladá fronta Dnes (Young Front Today, MF Dnes) 
which is the largest broadsheet newspaper circulated in CZ.137 Mafra also owns several 
monthly magazines, a TV music channel, radio stations, and several web portals—
including one of the most visited news servers, iDnes.cz.138 This cartel of media outlets 
raises concerns that the Czech Republic is transforming into an oligarchy under Babiš, 
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earning him the nickname, “Babisconi”—a reference to the disreputable former Italian 
prime minister Silvio Berlusconi, who used his vast media empire to influence Italy’s 
politics for close to two decades.139 By owning media that is sympathetic to him, Babiš 
can influence what is reported about him, and thus skew a favorable perception. Although 
this is widely accepted as an unfair advantage for Babiš over other politicians, the Czech 
people support him, and elected him this October—further demonstrating the power of 
his influence and perhaps explains why he is considered the most influential man in 
Czech Republic.140 
 Although Babiš successfully secured the necessary votes and receives Zeman’s 
support, he is still tasked with forming a new coalition government to gain majority rule 
in Parliament. Currently, no other parties (the communist party is the only one 
considering aligning and they do not carry enough seats) within Parliament support a 
coalition with his ANO party due to the fraud charges recently brought against him.141 
Despite this challenge, he is expected to eventually obtain the coalition government 
required to provide him majority and thus, the capacity to influence new policies to his 
liking.  
Concerns arise regarding Babiš’ intentions on Czech membership within the EU 
due to his steadfast denunciation of the EU quota plan and refusal to further integrate into 
                                                 
139 Henry Foy, "Lunch with the FT: Andrej Babiš," Financial Times, 19 February 2016, 
https://www.ft.com/content/83908fd2-d4a5-11e5-829b-8564e7528e54. 
 
140 Czech News Agency (ČTK), "Politico Server: Babiš is Most Powerful Man in Czech 
Republic," Prague Daily Monitor, 30 October 2015, http://www.praguemonitor.com/2015/10/30/politico-
server-babi%C5%A1-most-powerful-man-czech-republic. 
 
141 Karel Janicek, "Czech Leader Asks Election Winner to Form Government," Houston 
Chronicle, 31 October 2017, http://www.chron.com/news/world/article/Czech-leader-asks-election-winner-
to-form-12320026.php.  
  
 76 
 
the EU. He opposes the adoption of the euro in CZ because he believes it infringes on 
Czech sovereignty and competitiveness. He said, “I want the Czech koruna, and an 
independent central bank. I don't want another issue that Brussels would be meddling 
with."142 Babiš purposely touts the idea of EU interference because it resonates with 
Czech citizens—who have the second-lowest amount of trust in the European Union 
(second to the Greeks) of all 28-member states.143 This “Euroscepticism” raises fears of a 
“Czexit” among an uneasy union of states still coping with Britain’s 2016 decision to 
leave the EU. However, Babiš frequently refutes concerns of leaving the EU, praising the 
economic benefits the CZ gains by operating within the EU market—including the 
impressive fact that the CZ maintains the lowest unemployment rate (2.7%) in the EU 
(and has for the past four years).144 Babiš affirms, "We are a democratic movement. We 
are a solid part of the European Union and we are a solid part of NATO. We certainly are 
not a threat to democracy. I am ready to fight for our national interests and to promote 
them."145 From this Babiš pledges Czech’s membership to the EU, but reiterates the 
priority of his commitment to both Czech sovereignty and national interests. Therefore, 
while Babiš remains committed to the EU, his determination to resist mass migration and 
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refusal to cooperate with the quota plan, are the more pressing challenges facing the EU.  
Due to the split between Western and Eastern perspectives on the topic of 
immigration and Babiš’ determination to not forfeit Czech’s sovereign rights merely to 
appease Brussels, this is likely to be the nucleus of numerous heated debates emanating 
from the new Czech administration. Babiš’ fear-inciting rhetoric paints him as a strong 
force, with the determination to fight for the safety of his people: "I will not accept 
refugee quotas for the Czech Republic. The situation has changed. We see how migrants 
react in Europe. We must react to the needs and fears of the citizens of our country. We 
must guarantee the security of Czech citizens. Even if we are punished by sanctions."146 
As Zeman and other V4 presidents argued in opposition to the quota plan, Babiš similarly 
advocates that the Czech Republic possesses the authority to authorize who it lets in its 
borders and that the EU mandate overstepped its boundaries by trying to force its laws on 
Czechs. Babiš realizes that Czechs detest this type of foreign hegemonic behavior and 
exploits it: "We have to fight for what our ancestors built here. If there will be more 
Muslims than Belgians in Brussels, that's their problem. I don't want that here. They 
won't be telling us who should live here."147 He also frequently expresses the common 
Czech Islamophobic sentiment, referring to the increased Islamist terrorism experienced 
in Western Europe: "After what has been happening in Europe, I say clearly that I don't 
want even a single refugee in the Czech Republic, not even temporarily."148  
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 While facing fraud charges, Babiš’ campaigned on these two topics, and won 
emphatically during the October elections. If Babiš decides to support Zeman during the 
upcoming presidential election in January, and Zeman achieves reelection, the two are 
likely to be a challenging force for Brussels and the future Muslim immigration. With 
similar sentiments on the rise within the V4 and Western Europe, the power of this 
potential coalition within the Czech government may host considerable influence on the 
European political stage. 
 
Summary 
The topic of Muslim immigration became a major topic of debate in the wake of 
the European Migrant Crisis of 2015. The Czech Republic and remaining V4 members 
denounced the controversial solution imposed by Brussels within the European Agenda 
on Migration. The Czech Republic’s history of discrimination against non-white 
immigrants and current refusal to accept a significant number of refugees, highlighted the 
divide between Western and Eastern Europe’s immigration policies (the V4’s stance was 
similar to Czech’s). As indicated in Chapters One and Two, the Czech Republic’s 
expressed Islamophobia is so deep-rooted that it has ennobled Czech officials condemn 
the EU quota plan as an infringement on Czech sovereignty. This stance successfully 
garners the support of the Czech public who share the same concern due to the Czech 
historical narrative of being subjugated by outside powers.  
Czech populist, Andrei Babiš, successfully campaigned on a platform of anti-
immigration and Euroscepticism during the October 2017 legislative elections. 
Throughout Babiš’ campaign, current Czech President Miloš Zeman supported him—
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publicly touting the same agenda. In turn, Zeman is likely to receive similar support for 
his upcoming run for reelection in January 2018. With the widespread support for anti-
Muslim and Eurosceptic policies throughout CZ, the Czech government is undergoing its 
furthest shift right since its split with Slovakia. With these recent events, and Czech’s 
historic and cultural narratives, this thesis predicts that a CZ led by both Babiš and 
Zeman will not only pose further challenges to the liberal EU consensus, but will 
encourage Prague to become more entrenched in its policies, continue to ally with the V4, 
and likely contribute to the rising populism trending throughout Central and Eastern 
Europe. Chapter Five will conclude this thesis’ findings and posit further predictions 
regarding the recent shifts in EU states. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 
 Nationalism is a defining characteristic of Czech identity as it has motivated them 
through centuries of oppression. Czech nationalism slowly emerged in the 15th century 
after facing the repeated crusades of the Roman Catholic Church. Not long after, the 
Czechs endured several centuries of what is known as the “Dark Ages” while subjected 
under Habsburg rule. After a period of enlightenment, Czech was invaded by fascist 
Germany, and almost immediately afterwards—subjected to communist rule under the 
Soviet Union for the next 40 years.  After three stints at achieving autonomy—all cut 
short by a foreign aggressor—the Czech Republic finally emerged a sovereign nation in 
1993 (after its split with Slovakia), becoming the secular, democratic country it remains 
today. Czech Republic’s history of repeated invasions (including its recent subjugation 
under the communist regime less than thirty years ago) and foreign attempts at 
oppressing Czech identity are impressed upon the Czech conscious and continue to 
influence Czech politics. Czech’s distrust of “outsiders” and fear of stronger, foreign 
powers threatening its sovereignty remain a genuine concern. It has manifested itself in 
Czech’s xenophobic and discriminatory attitude towards non-white, immigrant 
populations—including those that currently reside in CZ. 
 Czech’s two largest, non-white immigrant populations—the Roma and 
Vietnamese—immigrated to the CZ under distinct circumstances. While both groups 
undoubtedly endured discrimination, the contrasting manner with which each group 
arrived likely influenced Czech’s perception of them, explaining why they have 
integrated into Czech society at drastically different rates. Compared to the progress the 
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Vietnamese have made in assimilating into Czech society within a matter of decades, the 
Roma have realized only a fraction of progress although residing in the CZ for centuries. 
The Roma’s historic experience with systemic discrimination has resulted in their 
segregation in schools and neighborhoods, high rates of unemployment and criminal 
activity, and overall poor quality of life. Failure to meet the various assimilation 
benchmarks denies the Roma to obtain Czech citizenship or receive social and economic 
benefits, further perpetuating their inability to achieve any assimilation progress, and 
ultimately continuing the unproductive cycle. While some attribute the inability of the 
Roma to assimilate to be a result of a cultural phenomenon of the Roma, the comparative 
analysis of the Roma and Vietnamese suggests that the means with which the Roma 
arrived into the CZ may offer a better explanation. If the latter provided true, then it could 
be assumed that the immigration of any uninvited, non-white minority population, would 
likely produce comparably dismal results. In the context of the European Migrant Crisis, 
the inability of the Roma to assimilate is conflated with negative predictions of Muslims’ 
likelihood to assimilate. Thus, the Roma’s poor assimilation progress may be offered as 
an argument against Muslim immigration. 
 Czech’s xenophobic disposition garnered new attention during the migrant crisis 
as it became an outspoken critic of the European Agenda on Migration. Although Europe 
is facing the worst refugee crisis since the Second World War, the Czech Republic 
remains fixed in its refusal to accept large numbers of refugees. The quota plan requires 
the Czech Republic to accept 2,691 asylum seekers who are mostly Muslim. Czech’s 
current Muslim population is about 4,000. Therefore, if they were to abide by the 
mandate, they would be increasing their current Muslim population by 67%. This is 
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unacceptable for the Czech Republic who remains highly fearful of terrorism and 
continues to search for avenues to combat Islamists. Although some argue that 
immigration is beneficial to economies, aging populations, cultural diversity, and justify 
it morally, it is the leaders of the countries whom are responsible for assimilating those 
immigrants, while concurrently, promoting the security of their nations and people. In the 
Czech Republic, it seems that none of those reasons are worth the slightest risk of 
potential Islamist terror attacks that may occur when assimilation fails. Thus, the 
purported solution of the CZ is to not allow Muslim immigration—or at least keep it 
highly restricted. Islamophobia pervades both Czech elites and the public whose 
politicians, media, and anti-Muslim activists freely exhibit Islamophobic, racist, and 
discriminatory remarks and actions. This makes it challenging for the Czech perception 
of Muslims to improve. If Czech finally concedes and accepts asylum seekers, it would 
necessitate a “welcoming” perspective like the Vietnamese population experienced 
during their immigration to the CZ. However, because the quota is EU-mandated and 
considered an invasion of Czech sovereignty, it is unlikely that a “welcoming” 
perspective will ensue anytime soon. The haste with which asylum-seekers need to be 
redistributed is an insufficient amount of time to improve Czech Islamophobia. Forcing 
the immigration of another, non-white, minority population (in this case, Muslims) is 
likely to result in similar (or worse) discrimination and ineffective assimilation—
ultimately resulting in a disservice to those refugees.  
The stubborn refusal to comply with the EU ruling indicates a sharp turn from 
Czech’s past when it was eager to ally with the west via the EU, and concede power to 
the supranational organization. Today, the CZ rebukes the EU’s mandatory quota plan 
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even as the EU begins infringement proceedings against the Czech Republic—who has 
taken 12 of the EU-mandated 2,691 asylum seekers. It remains steadfast in its decision 
and is determined not to succumb to EU “blackmail.” The CZ asserts that the quota plan 
not only infringes on their sovereignty to decide their immigration policy, but conflicts 
with its openly anti-Muslim posture. The resolve with which the CZ adheres to its anti-
Muslim immigration stance—amid the threat of sanctions—demonstrates the depths of its 
Islamophobia. The quota plan has also been used as tool by politicians who want to wield 
the population’s support in refusing to integrate further into the EU. As the EU continues 
to negotiate Britain’s exit, Eurosceptic sentiments are increasingly alarming as a Brexit 
“domino effect” remains a concern. 
The collective V4 expresses similar contentions with the EU quota plan largely 
due to their shared history of foreign invasion and lack of experience with immigration 
from North Africa or the Middle East (like that experienced by Western Europe). They 
also possess largely homogeneous populations, Islamophobic dispositions, and thus also 
censure the EU for impeding their sovereignty. Although the plan expired in September 
2017, opposition to the plan remains and is growing among EU members (e.g., Estonia, 
Latvia, Romania, and Austria) due to increasing anti-immigrant views and concerns over 
future mass immigration. The growing anti-immigration attitudes and dissention within 
the EU regarding the quota plan suggest that the EU is likely to have to reconsider an 
alternative solution to cope with future immigration crises. Further, V4 politicians are 
capitalizing on the controversial quota plan, encouraging the rise of anti-Muslim and 
Eurosceptic sentiments to garner popularity among their people and promote a right-ward 
shift in their governments.  
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Czech politicians have strategically exploited the xenophobic and nationalistic 
feelings among the population to successfully campaign for their populist parties. Former 
Finance Minister Andrei Babiš’ populist ANO party decisively won in the October 
parliamentary elections, shifting the government to the right, and paving the way for 
Babiš to become Czech’s new Prime Minister. In turn, the upcoming January presidential 
elections is likely to witness Babiš’ support of Zeman for reelection. Both politicians 
maintain similar views regarding anti-Muslim immigration and limited EU integration. 
As Babiš successfully campaigned with this platform, Zeman is doing the same, and will 
likely gain the vote of ANO sympathizers. While Babiš will likely form a coalition 
government to help him pursue the policies he intends, with Zeman’s reelection, the two 
will combine to lead a nativist and Euroskeptic Czech Republic. Working together with 
the remaining members of the V4 will strengthen the role of the alliance who is 
committed to resisting mass immigration and the transfer of national sovereignty to the 
EU. A stronger V4 will accentuate the division between the pro-EU states of Western 
Europe with the increasingly Eurosceptic states in Central and Eastern Europe. The V4 is 
likely to pursue coalitions with additional governments (e.g., Austria) to the detriment of 
EU solidarity. This is becoming more feasible with the rise of populism throughout 
Europe and will further challenge the historically liberal consensus of the EU.  
The rising discontent with established parties, seemingly failed multiculturalism, 
and concerns of mass immigration have resulted in surge of support for anti-
establishment parties, populist’s ascendancy, and an overall shift in the political 
landscape in Europe. As the EU still copes with Britain’s exit, the V4’s non-compliance 
with the quota plan, and the Catalan secession crisis, EU solidarity is consistently under 
  
 85 
 
duress. To compound the pressure for reform, the populism that was most ostensible in 
Eastern Europe expanded to Central Europe in the recent September and October 
elections. With the left and right becoming increasingly defined in terms of their position 
on immigration, it is no surprise that virtually every European election in 2017 witnessed 
left parties suffering staggering defeats—losing their voters to far right anti-immigration 
populists. Austria’s October legislative elections resulted in the conservative Austrian 
People’s Party—led by the notoriously xenophobic, populist Sebastian Kurz—to become 
the largest party in the Austrian National Council. Also, in Germany, although Angela 
Merkel was reelected for her fourth term as Chancellor in September 2017, the rising 
discontent of liberal immigration policies bolstered a right-wing party to win seats in 
Parliament for the first time in more than half a century. The issues of state sovereignty 
and immigration are likely to continue to be highly influential platforms for politicians to 
campaign on, already effecting a rise of populism in Central and Eastern Europe, and 
threatening the solidarity of the European Union.  
Although the Czech Republic remains firmly within the EU, under Babis, it will 
limit further integration. With Czech’s productive economy and lowest unemployment 
rate in the EU, Babis maintains a cogent argument. Furthermore, he is determined to 
reform the EU regarding immigration. He insists that the CZ alone (any EU state) should 
decide their own immigration policies and who they will allow in. This sentiment is 
shared among the populists, indicating that Central and Eastern European states will 
continue to challenge Brussels in protest of its immigration policies and exertion of 
authority. To maintain harmony among its members in the changing political 
environment, it is essential for Brussels to find common ground the CZ and other populist 
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states. While this will likely further close the border to future refugees and effect a sense 
of isolationism, ultimately it may prevent further governments from shifting right, 
prevent other states to leave the EU, and salvage the remaining solidarity of the EU. 
This thesis has shown that deep-seated historical and cultural narratives shaping 
Czech identity continue to influence Czech policy. The effects of this xenophobic 
disposition are demonstrated in the study of the Czech Roma and Vietnamese populations 
that not only reiterates the thesis’ assertion of immutable sentiments, but suggests that 
any future mass Muslim immigration will likely face poor integration. This thesis also 
illustrates the efficacy of Czech politicians who capitalize on this ubiquitous Czech 
perception to garner public support—including the recent Parliamentary victory of a 
right-wing party and (likely) new populist Prime Minister. The evidence suggested within 
this thesis supports the assertion that the recent legislative election and the anticipated 
reelection of Czech’s current president will not only culminate in a fully-fledged populist 
Czech government, but both reflect and contribute to the rising populism witnessed 
throughout Central and Eastern Europe. 
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Jůn, Dominik. “Populist Politician Stages “Islamic State Invasion” in Old Town Square.” 
 radio.cz. 22 August 2016. http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/far-right-
 politician-stagesislamic-state-invasion-in-old-town-square. 
 
Katzorova, Denisa, Janku, Katerina Sidiropulu, Marada, Radim, and Arnost Svoboda. 
 “Country Report on Education.” Ethnic Differences in Education and Diverging 
 Prospects for Urban Youth in an Enlarged Europe. EDUMIGROM, 2008. 
 
Kenety, Brian. "Memories of World War II in the Czech Lands: The Expulsion of 
 Sudeten Germans." Radio Praha. 14 April 2005. 
 http://www.radio.cz/en/section/special/memories-of-world-war-ii-in-the-czech-
 lands-the-expulsion-of-sudeten-germans. 
 
Kern, Soeren. ""Czech Donald Trump" Wins Landslide Victory." Gatestone Institute. 22 
 October 2017. https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/11208/czech-election-babis-
 victory. 
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Macura, Vladimir, Píchová, Hana, and Craig Cravens. The Mystifications of a Nation: 
 "The Potato Bug" and Other Essays on Czech Culture. Madison: The University 
 of Wisconsin Press, 2010. 
 
"Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts." BBC News. 4 March 
 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911. 
 
Miklusakova, Marta and Ctibor Necas. "The History of the Roma Minority in the Czech 
 Republic." Radio Praha. 13 June 2000. http://romove.radio.cz/en/clanek/18913. 
 
"The Most Popular Czech Websites." Gemius Global. 28 July 2015. 
 https://www.gemius.com/agencies-news/the-most-popular-czech-websites.html. 
 
Muller, Robert. "Czech Deputy PM Rejects Refugee Quotas, Says Country Should Fight 
 Any EU Sanctions." Reuters. 3 August 2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
 czech-refugee-pm/czech-deputy-pm-rejects-refugee-quotas-says-country-should-
 fight-any-eu-sanctions-idUSKCN10E227. 
 
Muller, Robert. "Czech Election Winner Babis Meets Anti-EU Party in Hunt for Viable 
 Government." Business Insider. 26 October 2017. 
 http://www.businessinsider.com/r-czech-election-winner-babis-meets-anti-eu-
 party-in-hunt-for-viable-government-2017-10. 
 
Nienaber, Michael. "Merkel Calls on Hungary to Implement Court Ruling on Refugee 
 Distribution." Reuters. 11 September 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
 europe-migrants-germany-hungary/merkel-calls-on-hungary-to-implement-court-
 ruling-on-refugee-distribution-idUSKCN1BM2UW. 
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Williams, Allan and Vladimír Baláž. “Winning, Then Losing, the Battle with 
 Globalization:  Vietnamese Petty Traders in Slovakia.” International Journal of 
 Urban and Regional Research, vol. 29.3. February 2005.  
 
Wynne, Stephen. "Czech Republic Refuses to Yield on Migrants." Church Militant. 30 
 August 2017. https://www.churchmilitant.com/news/article/czech-republic-
 refuses-to-yield-on-migrants. 
 
Završnik, Gašper. "Czech President Miloš Zeman to Seek Reelection in 2018." 
 POLITICO. 10 March 2017. https://www.politico.eu/article/czech-president-
 milos-zeman-to-seek-reelection-in-2018/. 
 
“Zeman: Czechs Should Reject Refugee Quotas at Cost of EU Funds.” Prague Daily 
 Monitor.7 September 2017. http://praguemonitor.com/2017/09/07/zeman-czechs-
 should-reject-refugee-quotas-cost-eu-funds. 
